Carlos Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272

Background

Granda acted as a lookout in a 2007 reverse-sting plot to rob a tractor-trailer allegedly carrying 60–80 kg of cocaine; a shootout left two co-defendants dead and others wounded.
Superseding indictment charged Counts 1–5 (drug and violent offenses), Count 6 (§ 924(o) conspiracy to possess/use a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime or crime of violence), and Count 7 (§ 924(c) substantive). Jury convicted Counts 1–6 and acquitted Count 7. Sentence affirmed on direct appeal.
Count 6 alleged multiple alternative predicates (Counts 1–5). After conviction, the Supreme Court decided Davis (invalidating § 924(c)’s residual clause), and Eleventh Circuit decisions held Hobbs Act conspiracy no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause.
Granda filed an authorized second § 2255 petition arguing his § 924(o) conviction may rest on the now-invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy (Count 3), so the general verdict might be for a non-existent crime.
The district court denied relief; on appeal the Eleventh Circuit held Granda procedurally defaulted the claim and, on the merits, that any error was harmless because the invalid predicate was inextricably intertwined with several valid predicates the jury necessarily found.

Issues

Issue	Granda's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Davis (invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B)) can be applied to Granda’s authorized Johnson-based § 2255 claim	Davis applies; jury may have relied on Count 3 (invalid predicate), so conviction must be vacated	The petition was procedurally defaulted and, in any event, other valid predicates support Count 6	Court: Davis governs the vagueness question but Granda’s claim fails on procedural-default and harmless-error grounds
Whether Granda’s § 2255 claim is procedurally defaulted and, if so, whether cause and actual prejudice excuse the default	The claim was not reasonably available on direct appeal; Davis/Johnson provided a new rule	Claim was defaulted; no cause shown and no actual prejudice because other valid predicates existed	Court: Procedural default; Granda cannot show cause or actual prejudice
Whether the jury may have relied solely on the invalid Hobbs Act conspiracy predicate (actual prejudice / actual innocence)	Because of the general verdict, we cannot rule out reliance on the invalid predicate; conviction should be vacated	The predicates are inextricably intertwined; the jury convicted on multiple valid predicates so no substantial likelihood the jury relied only on Count 3	Court: No substantial likelihood jury relied solely on Count 3; Granda cannot show actual prejudice or actual innocence
Whether instructing on an invalid alternative predicate requires reversal or is harmless error	Any possibility of conviction on an invalid ground is fatal (Stromberg/Yates principle)	Stromberg-type error is subject to Brecht harmless-error analysis on collateral review; record shows harmlessness here	Court: Apply Brecht; error harmless because alternative valid predicates were necessarily found

Key Cases Cited

Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2020) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause void for vagueness)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual-clause vagueness decision that spawned related collateral claims)
Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019) (Hobbs Act conspiracy not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A))
In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019) (retroactivity and interplay of Johnson/Davis questions for successive § 2255 motions)
United States v. Granda, [citation="346 F. App'x 524"] (11th Cir. 2009) (direct-appeal disposition of Granda’s convictions)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard on collateral review)
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (Stromberg-type instructional error governed by Brecht rather than automatic reversal)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (actual-innocence gateway to federal collateral relief)