Carlos Coyomani-Cielo v. Eric Holder, Jr., 758 F.3d 908

Petitioner Carlos Coyomani, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1997 and conceded removability; he sought cancellation of removal as a non‑permanent resident.
He was convicted in Illinois (2000) of domestic battery and resisting a peace officer; domestic battery qualified as a crime of moral turpitude (CIMT) and, under prior Seventh Circuit precedent, as an aggravated felony for some INA provisions.
DHS charged him as present without admission (inadmissible) and with a CIMT; the immigration judge (IJ) found him removable as inadmissible but declined to treat the CIMT conviction as rendering him inadmissible under the sentencing exception.
The IJ nevertheless held him ineligible for cancellation because his domestic‑battery conviction constituted an offense “under” INA § 237(a)(2) (aggravated felony) and § 240A(b)(1)(C) bars cancellation for aliens convicted of offenses under §§ 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2).
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, adopting its prior approach (Matter of Cortez / Almanza): when § 240A(b)(1)(C) cross‑references §§ 212/237, the relevant inquiry is the crime’s elements and potential sentence—immigration‑status language (e.g., “after admission,” “deportable”) is not considered.
The Seventh Circuit found § 240A(b)(1)(C) ambiguous at Chevron step one but upheld the BIA’s interpretation as reasonable at step two and denied Coyomani’s petition for review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 240A(b)(1)(C)’s cross‑reference to §§ 212(a)(2) and 237(a)(2) includes immigration‑status language (e.g., “after admission”) or only the crime/elements and sentence	Coyomani: the cross‑reference should be read with status terms; because he was never admitted, § 237(a)(2) (which speaks to deportable after admission) does not render him ineligible — only § 212(a)(2) could apply	Government/BIA: § 240A(b)(1)(C) refers to offenses “under” those sections meaning the substantive crimes and associated sentence exposure; status language is not relevant to eligibility	Court: Statute ambiguous at Chevron step one; BIA’s construction (consider only offense elements and sentence, not status language) is reasonable at step two and entitled to Chevron deference; petition denied

INS v. Aguirre‑Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (agency interpretations of immigration law reviewed under Chevron)
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishing two‑step deference framework)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (statutory interpretation in immigration law informed by related statutory text)
LaGuerre v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir.) (Illinois domestic battery qualifies as a crime of violence/aggravated felony under certain INA provisions)
Reyes v. Holder, 714 F.3d 731 (2d Cir.) (interpreting a NACARA regulation to treat admissible and inadmissible aliens differently for cancellation eligibility)
Gonzalez‑Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir.) (discussing BIA interpretation of similar § 240A cross‑reference and finding the BIA’s reading logical)