932 F.3d 1237
9th Cir.2019Background
- In 1980 Carlos Avena killed two men during a carjacking; he was convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to death after a 1981 trial.
- At guilt phase counsel Marvin Part conceded Avena’s guilt, called no defense witnesses, and presented almost no defense; evidence against Avena was strong (co-defendant testimony, recorded interrogation, ballistics).
- At the penalty phase the prosecutor presented aggravating evidence (prior shootings, an alleged jail homicide, and an assault on a deputy) and described Avena as a "killing machine;" Part presented no meaningful mitigation evidence or family witnesses.
- Postconviction evidence showed Avena had a history of chronic PCP use affecting behavior, an abusive childhood, loving family relationships, and witnesses who could support a self‑defense theory for the jail homicide; trial counsel did little investigation and did not contact family or develop mitigation.
- The California Supreme Court denied habeas relief in 1996, finding no Strickland prejudice; Avena later pursued federal habeas, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the state court unreasonably applied Strickland under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Part provided constitutionally adequate performance at the penalty phase (Strickland performance) | Avena: Part failed to investigate or present mitigating evidence (family, social history, PCP effects, self‑defense), falling below prevailing professional norms | State: Trial counsel made tactical decisions (avoiding family testimony because of a "chair incident"; self‑defense theory was weak) | Held: Counsel's performance was deficient — investigation and presentation of mitigation and self‑defense were unreasonable and lacked a reasonable tactical basis |
| Whether Avena proved Strickland prejudice under AEDPA (i.e., the CA Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland) | Avena: The omitted mitigation (abuse history, PCP intoxication/long‑term effects, good character, witnesses to jail incident) would likely have changed at least one juror's sentencing verdict | State: Aggravating evidence was strong; the state court reasonably concluded mitigation was meager and would not have affected the verdict | Held: The California Supreme Court’s no‑prejudice ruling was objectively unreasonable under AEDPA; there is a reasonable probability at least one juror would have struck a different balance, so habeas relief as to sentence is warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel must conduct thorough mitigation investigation; reasonableness of investigation reviewed)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (deference to counsel’s perspective but investigation duties at sentencing emphasized)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review under AEDPA is limited to evidence before the state court)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (standard for unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application framework under AEDPA)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (mitigating evidence at sentencing is constitutionally indispensable)
- Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (individualized sentencing considerations required in capital cases)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (sentencers must be able to consider mitigating evidence about background and character)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (deference in habeas review does not eliminate meaningful review of state rulings)
- Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (prejudice inquiry requires reweighing aggravating evidence against totality of mitigation)