Carla Frew v. Thomas Suehs
688 F. App'x 249
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Long-running class action (begun ~1996) challenging Texas’s provision of EPSDT Medicaid services; a 1996 Consent Decree and a 2007 Corrective Action Order (CAO) remain in effect.
- The 2007 CAO included an eleven-part plan; one part required four-year review procedures for “Check Up Reports and Plans for Lagging Counties,” culminating in conference and, if no agreement, court resolution.
- Contemporaneous 2007 Fee Order stated Plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work on the case and set procedures for fees incurred before and after the CAO; its scope was disputed.
- In 2012 the parties conferred per the CAO but disagreed; both filed motions. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted Defendants’ motion to eliminate the checkup/lagging-counties provisions under Rule 60(b)(5).
- Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees for work on both motions. The district court awarded the full requested fees without analyzing reasonableness or the Plaintiffs’ degree of success; Defendants appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit held Plaintiffs were prevailing parties for these discrete, CAO‑contemplated motions but vacated and remanded because the district court failed to apply a reasonableness inquiry that considers degree of success.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" under §1988 for fees related to the 2012 motions | The CAO expressly contemplated conference/motion practice; Plaintiffs prevailed as this final CAO step was part of relief they earlier obtained | Plaintiffs lost the 2012 motions, so they are not prevailing parties for those post‑decree efforts | Plaintiffs are prevailing parties for these discrete, CAO‑contemplated motions because the procedure itself was part of the relief obtained in 2007 |
| Whether the 2007 Fee Order contractually entitles Plaintiffs to fees for all work on the case without typical judicial scrutiny | The Fee Order broadly states Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work on the case, implying ongoing entitlement | Defendants read the Fee Order as limited to fees through CAO entry; alternatively, even if it grants entitlement, it cannot waive reasonableness review | The court did not decide full scope of contractual entitlement but held that even contractual fee awards remain subject to judicial reasonableness review unless the contract unmistakably waives it |
| Whether Buckhannon and related precedents bar fees for unsuccessful post‑decree work | Plaintiffs argue the CAO’s dispute-resolution process makes these motions enforcement/compliance work tied to prior success | Defendants rely on circuits requiring a material alteration in legal relationship or subsequent order to award fees for post‑decree unsuccessful efforts | Because the motions were part of a discrete CAO procedure Plaintiffs obtained, Buckhannon-type limits do not preclude fees here; the court avoided choosing among circuit approaches |
| Whether the district court abused discretion by not considering degree of success in reasonableness analysis | Plaintiffs contend Fee Order/prevailing status required fee award and district court correctly awarded fees | Defendants argue degree of success is central under Hensley and must be considered; district court erred by not doing so | The Fifth Circuit held the district court erred in omitting consideration of reasonableness and the degree of success and remanded for such review |
Key Cases Cited
- Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2015) (background procedural history of this litigation)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting the "catalyst" theory for fee awards)
- Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (consent decrees can make a party prevailing)
- Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (postdecree enforcement fees may be recoverable)
- Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 1996) (interim fee awards and monitoring consent decrees)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (reasonableness of §1988 fees; degree of success is critical)
- Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004) (restrictive approach to fees for unsuccessful postdecree efforts)
- Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013) (fees for postdecree work limited to actions necessary to enforce and that secure prior success)
- Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (twelve‑factor reasonableness framework for fee awards)