Carla Boston v. United States Steel Corporati
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4135
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Carla Boston, a union-represented clerical employee with 18 years’ service, was laid off in Dec. 2008 but remained on layoff status and eligible to bid on posted clerical II jobs.
- Between Sept. 2010 and Jan. 2012 Boston was awarded three different clerical II positions (BOF, Pass Control, Ironworks) and was disqualified from each after the 30-day training period; unions filed grievances that were denied.
- Boston filed an EEOC charge in Oct. 2010 alleging age/sex discrimination based on the BOF disqualification (no timely suit followed). She filed a second EEOC charge on Apr. 10, 2012 alleging retaliation for the 2010 charge based on the Jan. 10, 2012 Ironworks disqualification.
- Boston sued in federal court (June 2013) asserting Title VII and ADEA retaliation and a state common-law IIED claim; U.S. Steel moved for summary judgment.
- The district court (after reconsideration) granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel on all claims; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Boston’s prior disqualifications were time-barred or not properly before the court and that she failed to prove retaliation or employer liability for IIED.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / scope of claims | Boston treated multiple disqualifications as a continuing pattern tied to her 2010 EEOC charge | U.S. Steel: BOF (Oct 2010) and Pass Control (May 2011) acts are discrete and time-barred; Apr 2012 EEOC charge alleges only Jan 10, 2012 act | Court: BOF and Pass Control claims time-barred or not properly before court; may be considered only to support timely claim |
| Retaliation — direct evidence | Filing of 2010 EEOC charge motivated Ironworks disqualification; trainer Graham and supervisors acted in retaliation | U.S. Steel: disqualification based on poor performance and lack of meeting job requirements; decisionmakers unaware of 2010 charge | Court: No causal proof supervisors knew of or were motivated by 2010 charge; direct method fails |
| Retaliation — indirect / pretext | Boston met expectations and similarly situated employees were treated better; U.S. Steel’s stated reasons are pretext | U.S. Steel: legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons (poor performance, missed procedures); no evidence of pretext | Court: Boston failed to show she met legitimate expectations, or that reasons were pretextual; indirect method fails |
| Cat’s‑paw liability / IIED vicarious liability | Trainer Graham’s alleged deliberate withholding of training and comments show animus and caused disqualification; U.S. Steel should be liable | U.S. Steel: Graham’s conduct was personal/insubordinate and not motivated by employer business purpose; no evidence Graham knew of the EEOC charge | Court: Evidence insufficient to impute retaliatory animus (Staub standard) or to establish employer vicarious liability for IIED; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Lucero v. Nettle Creek Sch. Corp., 566 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2009) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2008) (direct method for retaliation)
- Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2006) (elements of retaliation claim)
- Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd., 276 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2002) (protected activity as motivating factor)
- Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2005) (discrete acts start new filing period)
- Filipovic v. K & R Exp. Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 1999) (300‑day filing rule under Title VII)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework)
- Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2008) (pretext standard)
- Long v. Teachers’ Retirement Sys. of Illinois, 585 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2009) (circumstantial evidence and timing for animus)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (U.S. 2011) (cat’s‑paw liability analysis)
- Green v. National Steel Corp., 197 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (employer’s right to make business decisions and honest‑belief rule)
- Honaker v. Smith, 256 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2001) (IIED in employment context)
- McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. 1988) (elements and limits of IIED under Illinois law)
- Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985 (Ill. 2007) (scope of employment for vicarious liability)
- Wright v. City of Danville, 675 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1996) (personal motive defeats vicarious liability)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and significant probative evidence)