Carey v. Inslee, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1220

Plaintiffs are public school employees in WEA-represented bargaining units who were nonmembers and previously had agency (union) fees deducted from paychecks under Washington law and Abood.
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus (overruling Abood), and WEA and state actors immediately stopped collecting agency fees and initiated reconciliations/refunds.
Plaintiffs sued seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, § 1983 damages/equitable relief (disgorgement/restitution) for prior fee collections, and later-added state-law tort claims.
WEA moved to dismiss or for summary judgment arguing mootness of prospective relief, that Janus supplies the declaratory ruling, and that WEA has a § 1983 good-faith defense for past collections based on reliance on then-valid statute and precedent.
The court found prospective injunctive and declaratory claims moot given WEA’s and the State’s prompt and permanent-seeming cessation; it also granted summary judgment for WEA on the § 1983 monetary/equitable claims because WEA acted in subjective good faith relying on existing law.
Remaining state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after the federal claims were resolved.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of prospective injunctive relief	Janus merely restates existing law; WEA has no formal obligation to comply absent litigation, so relief still needed	WEA ceased fee collection immediately after Janus; cessation is permanent and not reasonably expected to recur	Injunctive relief dismissed as moot (policy change viewed as permanent)
Mootness of declaratory relief	Janus doesn’t bind WEA; declaratory relief still warranted to resolve rights	Janus resolved the constitutional question and WEA/state ceased practice; no immediate controversy exists	Declaratory relief dismissed as moot
Availability of a good-faith defense under § 1983 for prior fee collection	Good faith unavailable because Wyatt limits private-party defense to common-law analogue (e.g., conversion), or requires subjective evidence of belief in unconstitutionality; equitable claims not barred	WEA relied on a presumptively valid statute and Abood; subjective good-faith belief in lawfulness defeats § 1983 liability and bars equitable restitution here	WEA entitled to good-faith defense: acted believing conduct lawful; § 1983 monetary/equitable claims dismissed
Supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims	Plaintiffs recently added state claims seeking restitution and tort remedies	Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction if federal claims dismissed	State-law claims dismissed without prejudice under § 1367(c)(3)

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (permitted compelled agency fees from public-sector nonmembers for collective-bargaining costs)
Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (overruled Abood; compelled agency fees violate the First Amendment)
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (addressed whether private parties sued under § 1983 can assert immunity; left open availability of good-faith defenses)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (judiciary’s role to say what the law is)
Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2014) (voluntary cessation and standards for mootness of government policy changes)
Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognized a good-faith defense for private parties in § 1983 contexts)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard; evidence viewed in nonmoving party’s favor)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden-shifting)
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (equitable restitution requires tracing of identifiable funds)