Carcamo v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dept.
B296666
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 3, 2021Background
- On Feb. 15, 2014, deputies arrested LaShun Carcamo, Anthony January, and Kirby Hales in Carson and booked them overnight for "drunk in public" under Carson Municipal Code §4201; they were never prosecuted under the Penal Code.
- Deputies testified they observed objective signs of intoxication (odor of alcohol, bloodshot/watery eyes, swaying, an open beer can) and arrested the individuals under the city ordinance rather than Penal Code §647(f).
- Plaintiffs sued for false arrest; the trial court denied a directed verdict on preemption, refused plaintiffs’ requested instructions on Penal Code §647(f), and instructed the jury that a violation of C.M.C. §4201, if proved, would establish probable cause.
- The jury found for defendants on the special verdict form; plaintiffs appealed arguing preemption and erroneous jury instructions.
- The Court of Appeal held C.M.C. §4201 is preempted by Penal Code §647(f), the trial court erred in instructing that the municipal ordinance could supply probable cause, and the error was prejudicial; the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Penal Code §647(f) preempts Carson Municipal Code §4201 | §647(f) occupies the field of criminal regulation of public intoxication; §4201 is void as preempted | §4201 remained on the books and officers reasonably relied on it; preemption inapplicable in civil false-arrest context | Court: §647(f) preempts §4201; the municipal ordinance is void under binding Supreme Court precedent (Koehne, Zorn, Lopez) |
| Whether an arrest based solely on a void municipal ordinance can provide probable cause | Arrests based on a preempted ordinance cannot supply objectively reasonable probable cause | Officers acted in good faith and reasonably relied on the ordinance being in the code | Court: Good-faith belief does not cure lack of objective probable cause when ordinance was preempted and invalid (following McNeil, Cox) |
| Whether the trial court properly refused to instruct jury on §647(f) elements | Jury should have been instructed on §647(f) because preemption was dispositive of probable cause | Civil context and officers' belief make the municipal-code basis sufficient for probable cause instruction | Court: Refusal was error because defendants relied solely on the preempted ordinance to justify arrest |
| Whether the instructional error was prejudicial requiring reversal | The jury was given only the void-ordinance basis for probable cause; thus error likely affected outcome | Jury found no false arrest based on the instruction; defendants argue harmless or implied §647(f) finding | Court: Error was prejudicial — reasonable probability it affected verdict; reversal and remand required |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Koehne, 59 Cal.2d 646 (1963) (California Supreme Court held state statute occupied field of public intoxication, invalidating conflicting city ordinances)
- In re Zorn, 59 Cal.2d 650 (1963) (same principle as Koehne regarding preemption of local public-drunk laws)
- People v. Lopez, 59 Cal.2d 653 (1963) (affirmed invalidation of local ordinances criminalizing public intoxication as preempted)
- People v. De Young, 228 Cal.App.2d 331 (1964) (reaffirmed that extensive state statutes preempt local criminal regulation of intoxication)
- People v. McNeil, 96 Cal.App.4th 1302 (2002) (arrest based on long-preempted local ordinance lacked probable cause despite officers’ good-faith belief)
- People v. Cox, 168 Cal.App.4th 702 (2008) (officers’ honest belief in a preempted local ordinance does not render an arrest objectively reasonable)
- Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033 (2007) (discusses probable cause standard in civil false-arrest actions)