944 F.3d 9
1st Cir.2019Background
- DOS administers the Au Pair Program under the Fulbright‑Hays Act and 22 C.F.R. pt. 62; sponsors (private placement agencies) are regulated and subject to sanction by DOS, not host families.
- DOS au pair regulations require sponsors to ensure au pairs are compensated based on 45 hours/week and “in conformance with the requirements of the FLSA.”
- Massachusetts laws at issue: the Fair Wage Law (state minimum wage and overtime) and the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Act (DWBORA) with implementing regs imposing hours, overtime, deduction, recordkeeping rules on employers (including host families).
- Plaintiffs (Cultural Care and two host families) sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the federal Au Pair Program preempts Massachusetts wage-and-hour laws as applied to au pairs/host families.
- District Court dismissed the complaint; plaintiffs appealed. First Circuit affirms, finding no field or obstacle preemption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal Au Pair regulations impliedly preempt Massachusetts wage-and-hour laws (field preemption) | DOS regs are comprehensive and implicate foreign-affairs/immigration; thus field is occupied and state law is ousted | State wage-and-hour regulation is a local employment matter; De Canas presumption against preemption applies; DOS regulates sponsors not employers | No field preemption; plaintiffs failed to show affirmative intent to occupy the field |
| Whether DOS regulations create an implied nationwide ceiling that prevents states from imposing greater wage/hours/recordkeeping requirements on host families (obstacle preemption) | DOS objectives (encouraging broad host-family participation and uniform cultural exchange) require a uniform federal ceiling; state laws would frustrate program goals and deter host families | DOS language targets sponsors and references FLSA (which is non‑preemptive); regulatory text/history do not show a ceiling-setting intent; speculative economic effects insufficient | No obstacle preemption; plaintiffs didn’t identify affirmative evidence that DOS intended a ceiling that would preempt state laws |
| Whether DOS regulatory history or agency practice supports preemption | Agency commentary about “uniform compensation” and guidance materials show an intent to set nationwide limits | Context of the history shows concern was choosing an FLSA‑compliant floor for sponsors and deferring to DOL; history does not show intent to preempt state law | Regulatory history does not supply the affirmative evidence needed for preemption |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying reconsideration or leave to amend | New affidavits/letters purportedly supply new evidence; amendment would allow refining claims | District court properly declined to consider contested extra-record materials on Rule 12(b)(6); judgment had been entered before Rule 15 motion | No abuse of discretion; denial of Rule 59(e) and leave to amend affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (presumption against state regulation where federal interests dominate; preemption framework)
- De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (state regulation of employment of aliens not per se preempted; presumption against preemption in immigration context)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (limits on presumption against preemption where federal enactments are central to state claim)
- Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (obstacle preemption: state law invalid if it stands as an obstacle to federal objectives)
- Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (field‑preemption tests: pervasive federal regulation or dominant federal interest)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (courts should not defer to agency conclusion that state law is preempted; assess persuasiveness)
- Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (agency regulation that preserves choice can imply preemption where state law would eliminate choices)
- Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (no preemption where federal regulation did not show an intent to preserve manufacturer choice as its purpose)
- Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (federal statute intended to both prohibit and permit conduct can preempt conflicting state laws)
- Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (courts should avoid speculation about agency intent; assess textual and historical evidence of preemptive purpose)
- John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (facial vs as‑applied challenge labels immaterial; must meet facial‑challenge standards)
- Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (agency preemption principles)
- Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 3d 1066 (D. Colo. 2016) (similar issue addressing preemption and au pair programs)