Capitol Infrastructure, LLC v. Plaza Midtown Residential Condominium Ass'n
306 Ga. App. 794
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Association sought a declaratory judgment against Capitol on whether OCGA § 44-3-101(c) allows termination of the Master Community Infrastructure Agreement and related contracts.
- OCGA § 44-3-101(c) permits cancellation within 12 months after the declarant’s control period; the 12-month window here had expired.
- Agreement (July 13, 2005) provided a 12-year term after the first occupancy certificate for the Plaza Midtown condo; Capitol installed telecom infrastructure but did not provide services.
- December 2005: Plaza Midtown Property, LLC recorded the condominium declaration and the Association formed under its control; Service Provider Designation Agreement designated Capitol as exclusive agent for bulk service contracts.
- Between 2005 and 2007, the Association and Capitol entered several telecom contracts; after control ended in August 2006, the Association attempted to terminate in May–July 2007 by votes and conditional letters, awaiting a declaratory judgment.
- By August 2009, the superior court granted a declaratory judgment in the Association’s favor, but the issue was moot because the 12-month termination period had expired; the court’s order was vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May the Association terminate under OCGA § 44-3-101(c)? | Association argues the Agreement falls within § 44-3-101(c) and is terminable. | Capitol contends the § 44-3-101(c) window had closed, making any declaratory ruling moot. | No; moot because the 12-month period expired; termination rights no longer existed. |
| Was the declaratory judgment proper given mootness? | Association sought guidance on a live legal question. | Because the issue was moot, declaratory relief was inappropriate. | Vacated; declaratory judgment on a moot question was improper. |
| Were conditional terminations within the 12 months permissible? | Association argues it timely sought termination and issued conditional notices. | Conditional termination is not allowed under the plain text of § 44-3-101(c). | Not permissible; conditional terminations do not trigger § 44-3-101(c) rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210 (1999) (Declaratory Judgment Act limits; advisory opinions not allowed; must have live controversy)
- Chase v. State, 285 Ga. 693 (2009) (Meaning of statutory text and legislative intent in statutory construction)
- Shorter College v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 279 Ga. 466 (2005) (Textual approach; determine legislature’s intent from plain language)
- Early v. Early, 269 Ga. 415 (1998) (Statutory interpretation; plain and unambiguous language governs)
- Bingham v. C & S Nat. Bank, 205 Ga. 285 (1949) (Declaratory judgments and statutory interpretations)