Shorter College v. Baptist Convention of GeorgiaShorter College v. Baptist Convention of Georgia
Lead Opinion
In 1959, Shorter College (College) amended its charter to confer on the Baptist Convention of the State of Georgia (GBC) the exclusive authority to name the school’s Board of Trustees (Board). As a result of the grant of this power to choose the trustees, GBC assumed the status of a “member” of the College.
The dispute culminated in GBC’s rejection of candidates proposed by the College and the naming of two new trustees who lacked the prior approval of the school. Cоntending that GBC’s power to select the trustees was an encroachment on the independence of the institution which endangered its accreditation, the Board thereafter sought to amend the bylaws to allow the school some input into the process. However, GBC insisted on continued exercise of the exclusive authority granted to it by the charter, and it named several new trustees to the Board.
The College refused to recognize the new trustees selected by GBC. Instead, a majority of the “old” Board approved a plan, denominated as a “dissolution” of the College, whereby all assets of the school, including its name, would be transferred for no consideration to the Shorter College Foundation (Foundation). From the perspective of the “old” Board and its concern about accreditation, this transfer had the desired effect of divesting GBC of its authority to name the trustees, since the Foundation’s directors would not be subject to apрroval or removal by GBC.
Thereafter, the College and Foundation filed suit to recover certain pre-dissolution funds that GBC had budgeted for the school’s use. GBC answered and counterclaimed, seeking to enjoin the unilateral dissolution of the College by the “old” Board as a void transaction. The validity of the dissolution was addressed on motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted judgment in favor of the College and Foundation. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that “[t]his corporate reorganization is either a merger or a disposition of assets under the Nonprofit Code. It is not a true dissolution. Absent . . . GBC’s approval, it cannot stand.” Baptist Convention &c. of Ga. v. Shorter College,
1. “[A] corporation is an artificial, not a natural, person.” Eckles v. Atlanta Technology Group,
*468 implies the termination of its existence and its utter extinction and obliteration as an entity or body in favor of which obligations exist or accrue or upon which liability may be imposed. Liquidation of a corporation has been defined to mean the winding up of the affairs of the corporation by reducing its assets, paying its debts, and apportioning the profit or loss. A distributiоn of all assets is a “winding-up of the affairs” of the corporation and is synonymous with “liquidation.”
19 AmJur2d, Corporations, § 2348, pp. 453-454 (2004). This definition of a “dissolution” as the winding up and liquidation of all business affairs applies equally to both for-profit and non-profit corporations in Georgia.
The transaction at issue in this case would not constitute a “dissolution” in the context of for-profit corporations. The transfer of the assets of the College to the Foundation was not for the purpose of terminating the existence of the school and winding up its affairs, as would have occurred had the intended recipient been another educational institution already having a separate and independent existence, such as Emory, Mercer, Berry or any number of other colleges located in this state. Indeed, the aim of this “dissolution” was the exact opposite. The Board’s intent was the preservation of the assets of the College and the continuation of its existence, with the only anticipated result being the transfer of governing authority over the institution to the Foundation and the consequent termination of the power granted by the charter to GBC to select the trustees. As the Court of Appeals noted, the chair of the Board frankly acknowledged that this was the purpose of the “dissolution” in the following excerpt from a letter sent to her fellow trustees notifying them of two proposals that would be submitted for their approval at an upcoming meeting:
The first proposal seeks the Board’s approval to reorganize the College. This corporate reorganization will be accomplished by dissolving the corporate entity “Shorter College” and simultaneously . . . distributing all of the College’s assets and assigning all of its liabilities to (the Foundation). The Foundation, which will immediately be renamed “Shorter College,” will thereafter carry on all of the business and activities previously conducted by the College. (Emphasis supplied.)
Baptist Convention &c. of Ga. v. Shorter College, supra at 318 (3). Such a “reorganization” fails to qualify as a valid “dissolution” of a
The reorganization here attempted did not contemplate the termination of the corporate business, nor liquidation and distribution. It was an attempt to continue the corporate business under a new corporate entity .... This is not a dissolution. [Cit.]
Baptist Convention &c. of Ga. v. Shorter College, supra at 318 (3) (citing authority applicable to for-profit corporations). Simply put, while the assets of a dissolving fоr-profit corporation can be transferred, its underlying business cannot survive a “dissolution” since its commercial affairs must be wound up and liquidated. “Bodies corporate are not dead bodies, but living persons. When they die they are annihilated. Among artificial persons there is no resurrection from the dead____” State of Ga. v. The Atlantic and Gulf R. Co.,
It appears, therefore, that resolution of this case depends upon whether there is any legal distinction to be drawn between the dissolution of a for-profit and a non-profit corporation. The current Georgia Nonprofit Corporation Code “was drawn principally from the Georgia Business Corporation Code” and reflects “the desire to conform [it] to the Business Code whenever possible and appropriate . . ..” Comment to
With specific regard to
This is true even though, under
Appellants urge that, because a non-profit corporation does not have financial goals, it is inequitable to require the same complete destruction of the underlying business as with the dissolution of a for-profit corporation. However, the relevant inquiry is the statutory definition of “dissolution” and, in that regard, the specific wording used by the General Assembly, not general concepts of equity, is the controlling factor. “As long as the [statutory] language is clear and does not lead to an unreasonable or absurd result, ‘it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.’ [Cit.]” Ray v. Barber,
2.
Because a non-profit cоrporation does not have shareholders, the class of recipients authorized to receive its assets upon dissolution obviously cannot be the same as those who have a claim to the assets of a dissolving for-profit corporation. Because the recipients of a dissolving non-profit and for-profit corporation are different, the procedures for distribution of those assets must necessarily also differ. However, the differences in the composition of the сlass of those who have the ultimate claim on the assets of a dissolving corporation and in the procedures regarding the distribution of the assets to them do not have any material bearing on whether the underlying transaction upon which the distribution is based complies with the substantive requirements for accomplishing a corporate dissolution. Whether the distribution of a corporation’s assets constitutes a valid dissolution is not determined by how and to whom the assets were conveyеd.
As a matter of law, any dissolving corporation, whether or not for-profit, must wind up and liquidate “its business and affairs.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That transfer was not pursuant to a valid dissolution accomplished pursuant to
3. The trustees of a non-profit corporation are charged with acting “[i]n a manner [he or she] believes in good faith to be in the best interests of the corporation____”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that Shorter College’s Board of Trustees complied with its governing documents, the Geоrgia Nonprofit Corporation Code,
The majority errs by using a definition supplied by the American Jurisрrudence treatise, rather than focusing on the requirements established by the Georgia legislature. The treatise itself cautions against relying on its definition to the exclusion of state statutes: “[wjhen evaluating corporate administrative dissolution statutes that vary widely from state to state, it cannot safely be assumed that the term ‘dissolution’ has any strict meaning independent of the jurisdiction and precise context in which that term is applied.”
Because the procedure differs depending on which type of entity is being dissolved, the majority opinion is incorrect that “dissolution” means the same thing in Georgia’s for-profit and nonprofit corporation codes. When a for-profit corporation is dissolved, its business ceases to exist and its remaining assets are distributed to its shareholders under
I agree with the majority opinion that the Board complied with the letter of the law by dissolving the College and transferring its assets to the Foundation. It is undisputed that the College’s governing documents gave only the Board, and not the Baptist Convention of the State of Georgia (GBC), the right to vote on the College’s dissolution. Further, under
I also agree with the majority opinion that compliance with the letter of the law is not enough in this case. We must also ask whether the dissolution complied with the spirit of the law. The test for this is whether the dissolution violated the Board’s fiduciary duties.
Because the College was a nonprofit, the Board owed its fiduciary duties to the College’s mission, not to GBC as a member. GBC’s contrary contention mistakenly equates “members” of a nonprofit corporation with “shareholders” of a for-profit corporation. In for-profit corporations, the predominant view is that the board of directors owes its fiduciary duties to the corporation’s shareholders.
It is axiomatic that the board of directors [of a nonprofit] is charged with the duty to ensure that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out. This duty has been*475 referred to as the “duty of obedience.” It requires the director of a not-for-profit corporation to ‘Tie faithful to the purposes and goals of the organization,” since “fufnlike business corporations, whose ultimate objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives____”7
Therefore, the question is whether the Board’s actions furthered or hindered the College’s mission.
The College’s mission was “to provide quality higher education . . . integrating] Christian values within a nurturing community. ..The record shows that the College had real reason to believe that it would lose accreditation if it did not address the accreditor’s concerns over GBC’s influence. The loss of accreditation would have a devastating effect on any college or university, including an inability to attract the best students and faculty and a loss of essential financial aid for students. By taking the actions it did, the Board addressed the accreditor’s concerns over GBC’s influence, removed the barrier to reaccreditation, and thereby furthered the College’s mission of “providing quality higher education.”
The Foundation will also carry out the College’s religious mission by continuing to рromote a nurturing, Christian environment in which students will learn. Accordingly, the dissolution furthered both the College’s educational and religious missions, whereas ceding to GBC’s wishes would have likely cost it accreditation and severely damaged its educational mission. The Board thus fully complied with its fiduciary duties, as the majority opinion concedes.
In sum, despite the dissolution having complied with both the letter and the spirit of nonprofit law, the majority opinion also requires compliance with the proсedures for dissolving a for-profit corporation. These procedures are inapposite to nonprofit dissolutions. They are also unnecessary to prevent sham dissolutions; adherence to fiduciary duties accomplishes this purpose. Because the Board complied with the College’s governing documents, applicable
I am authorized to stаte that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.
Notes
19 AmJur2d, Corporations, § 2348, at 454 (2004).
See
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 586 (1992) (stating that “[t]here is probably no more frequently articulated principle of corporate law than that directors are fiduciariеs of the corporation and its stockholders,” hut revealing good reasons why these duties should sometimes extend to other constituents as well).
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer,