Capella Sales & Services Ltd. v. United States, Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee
878 F.3d 1329
| Fed. Cir. | 2018Background
- Commerce conducted a countervailing duty (CVD) investigation of aluminum extrusions from the PRC and set an all-others cash-deposit rate of 374.15% in its 2011 final determination and order.
- Several importers (MacLean-Fogg plaintiffs) challenged that final determination at the Court of International Trade (CIT); the CIT later issued a decision resulting in a revised all-others rate of 7.37% and Commerce published a Timken notice notifying the public the court decision was not in harmony with the final determination.
- Capella imported four entries of the subject merchandise in Nov 2011–Jun 2012 (pre-Timken notice) and did not request administrative review nor participate in MacLean-Fogg; CBP liquidated Capella’s entries at the 374.15% cash-deposit rate (Capella refused to pay and sued).
- Capella brought two complaints in the CIT seeking application of the lower MacLean-Fogg rate to its pre-Timken entries, arguing (inter alia) that the disparity made application of the 374.15% rate unreasonable and effectively punitive.
- The CIT dismissed both complaints under USCIT Rule 12(b)(6), holding the statutory scheme (19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(c)(1), 1516a(e)) and Commerce’s regulation require liquidation of pre-Timken, non-enjoined, non-reviewed entries at the rate in Commerce’s final determination.
- The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding the statute unambiguous as to those entries and, even if ambiguous, deferring to Commerce’s reasonable regulation (19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pre-Timken, non-enjoined, non-reviewed entries must be liquidated at Commerce’s final-determination rate | Capella: statute ambiguous; due to large disparity, Commerce must apply the later lower MacLean-Fogg rate retroactively | Government: statute unambiguous; Congress specified when court decisions or Timken notices alter liquidation; Commerce regulation reasonably applies rate in effect at entry | Held: Statute unambiguous — such entries are liquidated at the Secretary’s final-determination rate; alternatively, Commerce’s regulation is a permissible Chevron construction |
| Whether legislative history or purpose requires a discretionary exception for “excessive disparity” between rates | Capella: legislative history shows Congress intended remedial, not punitive, rates; ‘‘usual’’ case language supports relief in extraordinary disparities | Government: Congress created specific exceptions; legislative history does not override plain text | Held: Legislative history does not create a non‑statutory exception; plain text controls |
| Whether Commerce’s regulation (19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)) is a reasonable interpretation of the statute | Capella: application here is unreasonable given punitive effect | Government: regulation sensibly ensures finality and administrability; encourages use of statutory remedies | Held: Even if statute ambiguous, the regulation is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference |
| Whether Capella stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) | Capella: alleged facts support a claim for relief from application of the 374.15% rate | Government: pleadings do not overcome statutory scheme and regulation | Held: Pleadings insufficient; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012) (CIT decision holding Commerce’s 374.15% rate unlawful)
- MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012) (CIT decision affirming lower Commerce rate adopted after reconsideration)
- Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding liquidation at original order rate absent challenge or review)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Timken Co. v. United States, 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (establishing public notice practice when court decisions are not in harmony with agency determinations)