60 N.E.3d 1149
Mass.2016Background
- Plaintiffs are sentenced Massachusetts inmates who were placed in Special Management Units (SMUs) in nondisciplinary administrative segregation and allege SMU conditions are effectively solitary confinement.
- SMU conditions: cell confinement ~23 hours/day, minimal recreation, limited showers, noncontact visits, no access to general programs, limited canteen/visitation — more restrictive than general population and similar to Departmental Segregation Units (DSUs).
- Plaintiffs allege defendants refused to provide DSU procedural protections (timely hearings, conditional release criteria, visitation/canteen privileges), violating DSU regulations, federal and state due process (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and G. L. c. 127, § 32.
- After the complaint and class-certification motion were filed, this court decided LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012), which held inmates in SMU awaiting-action status for more than 90 days are entitled to notice, a hearing, and written posthearing findings; the Superior Court judge treated LaChance as resolving plaintiffs’ claims and dismissed the amended complaint.
- Appeals Court dismissed the appeal as moot because none of the named plaintiffs remained in SMUs; the Supreme Judicial Court allowed further review and held the appeal is not moot because the suit is a putative class action and the class allegations remain operative.
- The SJC reversed the Superior Court dismissal, holding LaChance I did not overrule Haverty and related cases and did not dispose of all claims; plaintiffs may pursue class certification and their claim that DSU protections apply to SMU placements that are DSU-like.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of appeal after named plaintiffs left SMUs | Class action allegations keep case alive; voluntary cessation by releasing named plaintiffs cannot moot class claims | Case is moot because no named plaintiff remains in SMU | Not moot: class allegations preserve justiciability; defendant bears heavy burden to show no recurrence |
| Whether LaChance I resolved plaintiffs' claims | LaChance provides some protections but did not resolve regulatory/state-law claims or class issues; plaintiffs can seek DSU protections for SMU class | LaChance fully defined required protections and defendants agreed to implement them, so dismissal/class certification unnecessary | LaChance I did not overrule Haverty or resolve all claims; plaintiffs may pursue class certification and DSU-regulation claims |
| Applicability of DSU regulations to SMU placements | SMU conditions that are substantially similar to DSU conditions trigger DSU procedural protections for indefinite nondisciplinary segregation | SMU is distinct and LaChance defines appropriate (federal) minimum; no need to apply full DSU regulatory regime universally | DSU regulations remain viable; Haverty and related precedent require DSU procedural protections where conditions are DSU-like for indefinite nondisciplinary segregation |
| Qualified immunity for damages under § 1983 (as implicated by LaChance I) | Plaintiffs seek damages for constitutional violations | Defendants asserted qualified immunity for individual-capacity claims | In LaChance I SJC held the constitutional rule (90-day limit without hearing) was newly articulated then, so qualified immunity barred damages for past conduct; that narrow holding does not dispose of class/regulatory claims here |
Key Cases Cited
- LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, 463 Mass. 767 (2012) (held inmates in SMU awaiting-action status for >90 days are entitled to notice, hearing, and written posthearing findings; clarified § 1983 qualified immunity issue)
- Haverty v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737 (2002) (applied DSU regulations and held procedural protections must be afforded where conditions are DSU-like and confinement is indefinite)
- Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 448 Mass. 412 (2007) (affirmed principles requiring DSU protections for indefinite nondisciplinary segregation)
- Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293 (1975) (class action is not mooted by settlement or termination of named plaintiff's individual claim when the underlying controversy continues)
- Gonzalez v. Commissioner of Correction, 407 Mass. 448 (1990) (discusses class certification where defendant's voluntary cessation may moot named plaintiff's claim; certifying the class can be appropriate)