312 Conn. 361
Conn.2014Background
- On Jan. 29, 2007, defendant’s employee Stephan Marinyak, returning from work at defendant Diane Mayo’s house, drove while intoxicated and severely injured plaintiff Janine Cannizzaro.
- State police found Marinyak’s blood alcohol level was .19%; plaintiff sued Marinyak and Mayo, alleging negligent supervision and negligent/reckless service of alcohol by Mayo.
- Mayo moved for summary judgment on the ground she owed no duty to protect plaintiff; trial court granted summary judgment for Mayo on counts alleging negligent supervision and service of alcohol.
- Appellate Court affirmed, reasoning Mayo did not owe a duty because the accident did not occur on her premises or while using her chattel; plaintiff appealed to this court.
- Evidence before the trial court (undisputed): Mayo did not serve or authorize alcohol to be served; she told the site supervisor to prohibit drinking; she was not present on the property for several days before the accident; Marinyak testified Mayo never saw workers drinking and alcohol was kept in the basement.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court but on different grounds: Mayo did not owe a duty under Restatement (Second) § 317 because she did not know or have reason to know of the necessity and opportunity to control Marinyak’s drinking.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mayo owed a duty to plaintiff for harms caused by her employee’s post-work intoxicated driving | Mayo had a duty because the harm was foreseeable from her employee’s drinking on her premises | No duty existed absent a special relationship or knowledge enabling control under Restatement § 317 | Held: No duty — plaintiff failed to show Mayo knew or should have known of necessity/opportunity to control employee’s drinking |
| Whether the Appellate Court erred relying on Murdock and Restatement §§ 314/317 | Foreseeability and public policy (preventing workplace drinking) support imposing duty | Murdock and §§ 314/317 preserve the general rule that there is no duty to control a third party absent a special relationship or knowledge | Held: Murdock and § 317 govern; public policy does not override the lack of the required knowledge/control factors |
| Whether Seguro v. Cummiskey required a different result | Seguro shows employers can owe a duty where they know and permit employee drinking at work | Mayo distinguished: unlike employer in Seguro, she had no knowledge, did not permit drinking, and instructed supervisor to prohibit it | Held: Seguro inapplicable on these facts |
| Whether Restatement (Third) § 41 should change the analysis | Plaintiff urged adoption to expand duty where employment facilitates access to alcohol | Court declined to adopt § 41 and noted its comments likely would not change result here | Held: Court declined to adopt § 41 for this case and found its adoption unnecessary to disposition |
Key Cases Cited
- Murdock v. Croughwell, 268 Conn. 559 (2004) (articulates duty analysis and limits on imposing duty to control third parties; discusses Restatement (Second) §§ 314 and 317)
- DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, 306 Conn. 107 (2012) (summarizes Connecticut summary judgment standard)
- Seguro v. Cummiskey, 82 Conn. App. 186 (2004) (employer liability where employer knew and permitted employee drinking at place of work)
- Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc., 76 Haw. 433 (1994) (employer may owe duty where it knows of systematic employee drinking on premises and condones it)