Candace Fox v. Deborah Johnson
832 F.3d 978
9th Cir.2016Background
- In 1984 Candace Fox pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in California in exchange for testifying against a co-defendant; the plea (not written) resulted in a 15-to-life sentence and, according to Fox, a promised release after 7.5 years with good behavior (the State characterized the promise as parole eligibility after 7.5 years).
- The plea colloquy and sentencing transcript contain mixed statements: the prosecutor said 15-to-life and that parole decisions were for the Parole Board, but an exchange at sentencing includes defense counsel and the prosecutor referencing parole in 7.5 years.
- Fox later learned she faced lifetime parole and that parole eligibility might be 10 years under California law; she filed state habeas petitions asserting (among other claims) that she was not advised of parole consequences and that she understood she'd be released after 7.5 years.
- In 1989 the state Superior Court granted habeas relief and set aside Fox’s guilty plea because she was not informed of mandatory lifetime parole; Fox sought withdrawal of the plea (not specific performance) and proceeded to trial, where she was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole.
- Fox exhausted state remedies over many years; she then filed a federal §2254 petition arguing she was due specific performance of the original plea bargain (release after 7.5 years). The district court denied relief; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Fox had no due process right to specific performance after she voluntarily (and successfully) rescinded the plea agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fox had a due-process right to specific performance of her 1984 plea after withdrawing the plea | Fox: State promised release after 7.5 years and breached that promise; she is entitled to specific performance rather than vindictive retrial and greater punishment | State: Any enforceable plea was nullified when Fox successfully sought to withdraw the plea; there was no plea left to enforce | Court: No due-process right to specific performance once the defendant sought and obtained withdrawal of the plea; rescission nullified the agreement |
| Whether the state courts unreasonably applied federal law or facts such that AEDPA relief is warranted | Fox: State courts ignored evidence of promise and Breach; rescission was an inadequate remedy because she had performed and served much of the agreed term | State: The Court of Appeal reasonably concluded Fox chose to rescind the deal; AEDPA deference applies and bars relief | Court: De novo review not necessary to grant relief because petitioner cannot prevail even without AEDPA deference; affirm denial of §2254 petition |
| Whether Santobello requires specific performance when the prosecution breaches a plea after defendant has performed | Fox: Santobello and subsequent precedent require courts to consider specific performance where withdrawal is inadequate and the defendant has performed | State: Santobello left remedy to state court discretion and withdrawal was an allowable remedy; Fox didn’t timely pursue enforcement in state habeas | Court: Santobello permits specific performance but does not create a constitutional right to enforcement after the defendant chose withdrawal rather than timely enforcement; no violation shown |
| Application of state contract/rescission principles to plea bargains | Fox: California contract principles and precedent (and fairness) support enforcing the bargained benefit once defendant performed | State: Rescission under state law voids contract and extinguishes obligations; plea was rescinded so no enforceable contract remained | Court: Rescission doctrine applies—withdrawal nullified the agreement and left no plea terms to enforce |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (when plea rests on prosecutor’s promise, remedy for breach—specific performance or withdrawal—must be determined by the court based on circumstances)
- Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (where defendant performed, rescission may be inadequate and specific performance can be required)
- Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (defendant has due-process right to enforce plea terms; specific performance may be required even if promised sentence is arguably unavailable under state law)
- Cuero v. Cate, 827 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2016) (specific performance ordered where withdrawal was inadequate remedy after state breached a plea and defendant had performed)
- Doe v. Harris, 640 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2011) (criminal defendants have a due-process right to enforce plea bargains)
- United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1988) (when a court permits plea withdrawal, parties are generally released from plea obligations)
- United States v. Jones, 469 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2006) (when a defendant successfully withdraws a guilty plea, the plea agreement is nullified and the government is no longer bound)
- United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 352 (9th Cir. 1999) (district court not required to reinstate a plea agreement after defendant withdrew plea)