Campbell v. Bradshaw
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5735
6th Cir.2012Background
- Campbell was convicted of four counts of aggravated murder and related offenses in Ohio; death sentences were imposed after a penalty-phase trial.
- On direct appeal, Ohio Supreme Court vacated the death sentence for allocution error and, on remand, reaffirmed the death sentence.
- Campbell sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising twelve grounds, with four alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and one alleging preclusion of voluntary intoxication as mitigation.
- The district court denied relief; Campbell appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reviews § 2254 determinations de novo with deferential standards.
- Key penalty-phase issue facts include admission of Campbell’s incarceration records and extensive veteran mitigation evidence, including his juvenile history and alleged intoxication.
- The court ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admitting incarceration records as penalty evidence | Campbell: admission was deficient performance and prejudicial. | Bradshaw: records were probative and part of defense strategy; not deficient or prejudicial. | No deficient performance or prejudice; strategy reasonable; no Strickland prejudice. |
| Failure to present juvenile incarceration mitigation | Campbell: more mitigation from juvenile history was necessary; counsel deficient. | Bradshaw: evidence was cumulative and overwhelming aggravation outweighed benefits; no prejudice. | No prejudice; not an unreasonable application of Strickland. |
| Failure to move for a change of venue | Campbell: extensive pretrial publicity tainted jury; venue should have changed. | Bradshaw: voir dire ensured impartial jury; venue motion would have been denied; no prejudice. | No prejudice; state court reasonably applied Strickland. |
| Trial court prevented argument of voluntary intoxication as mitigation | Campbell: intoxication evidence should have been allowed as mitigating factor. | Bradshaw: court properly refused specific instruction; nonstatutory factors allowed generally. | Error in precluding argument; not shown to have substantial injurious effect; harmless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court 2000) (clear standard for § 2254(d) application)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (Supreme Court 2011) (unreasonable application standard; deferential review)
- Pinholster v. Cullen, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (Supreme Court 2011) (record before state court governs § 2254(d) review)
- Cunningham v. v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (Supreme Court 2011) (see Pinholster discussion; (note: use official cases; avoid non-authoritative repeats))
- Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2011) (no prejudice where mitigation is cumulative or outweighed by aggravation)
