Camacho v. State
164 So. 3d 45
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Felix Camacho pleaded nolo contendere to burglary and grand theft charges from two incidents in 2012 and was sentenced in June 2013.
- At sentencing Camacho sought a downward departure under Fla. Stat. § 921.0026(2)(c) (substantial impairment of capacity) based on long-term boxing-related head trauma and neuropsychological testing.
- A neuropsychologist testified Camacho had significant frontal-lobe deficits and "dementia pugilistica," causing poor judgment and impulse control; the expert also noted depression and that medication could manage symptoms.
- The expert conceded Camacho self-medicated with prescription drugs and it was unknown whether intoxication contributed to the offenses.
- The trial court announced it did not think Camacho "met the criteria" or was "mitigation eligible," concluded it lacked legal authority to depart (apparently because of substance-use issues), and imposed maximum concurrent prison terms.
- The Second District reversed the sentences and remanded for resentencing because the record did not show whether the court rejected the expert evidence or mistakenly believed it had no authority to consider a downward departure under the statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a legal basis for downward departure under § 921.0026(2)(c) exists given evidence of brain damage | Camacho: neuropsychological evidence shows substantial impairment of capacity justifying departure | State: self-medication/substance use may explain impairment; statutory mitigation excludes impairment caused by substance abuse | Court: A legal basis may exist; substance-use evidence does not automatically preclude § 921.0026(2)(c) as a ground for departure |
| Whether competent, substantial evidence supports the factual predicate for departure | Camacho: expert and lay testimony provided competent, substantial evidence of frontal-lobe damage and impaired impulse control | State: evidence equally consistent with impairment from substance use rather than organic brain disease | Court: If the trial court accepted the expert testimony, the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support departure under (2)(c) |
| Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding it had no authority to depart because of substance abuse evidence | Camacho: trial court wrongly treated substance-use evidence as a jurisdictional bar to (2)(c) relief | State: trial court found no statutory criteria met given the mixed causal evidence | Court: The record suggests the trial court mistakenly concluded it had no authority to depart; that is legal error requiring remand unless the court explicitly made an evidentiary rejection |
| Appropriate remedy and scope of remand | Camacho: vacate sentence and permit resentencing allowing consideration of departure | State: (implicit) affirm sentence if court properly exercised discretion | Court: Vacated sentence in part and remanded for resentencing; trial court should clarify legal ground(s), factual findings, and discretionary reasoning on the record |
Key Cases Cited
- Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 1999) (establishes two-step process for downward departures: legal/factual predicate then discretionary decision)
- Daniels v. State, 884 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (trial court erred by concluding it lacked authority to depart where expert testimony supported treatment-related mitigation despite substance-abuse overlap)
- Kezal v. State, 42 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (vacatur/remand required where it is unclear whether the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it understood its authority to depart)