Calvin Hearne and Beverly Hearne v. Khera Interest, Inc.
14-15-00613-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 4, 2016Background
- Calvin and Beverly Hearne purchased contiguous lots in 1996 adjacent to their longtime homestead at 9401 Haddick Street and used the 1996 lots for family use, storage, and a garden.
- In 1998 a judgment against Calvin led to a receiver (Pratt) and, in 2006, a series of deeds purportedly conveyed the 1996 lot (9406 Seeker Street) ultimately to Khera Interest, Inc.; Khera began paying the property taxes after 2006.
- The Hearnes stopped receiving tax bills and ceased paying taxes on the 1996 lot; they claim continuous possession as part of their homestead since 1996.
- In 2014 Khera entered the 1996 lot to begin development; the Hearnes sued for trespass to try title, alleging the lot was their homestead (which would render the 2006 forced conveyance void) and alternatively alleging adverse possession.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Khera on adverse possession but denied homestead-related relief in an earlier ruling; later the court granted Khera’s second motion for final summary judgment, concluding Khera’s record title defeated the Hearnes’ trespass-to-try-title claim.
- On appeal the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding Khera failed to prove entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because record title alone did not conclusively defeat a prior-possession/homestead claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Khera’s record title conclusively defeats Hearnes’ trespass-to-try-title claim based on prior possession/homestead | Hearnes: continuous possession since 1996 as homestead voids 2006 receiver conveyance and defeats Khera’s record title | Khera: its record title rebuts presumption of title from prior possession; thus summary judgment is proper | Reversed: record title alone did not conclusively disprove Hearnes’ homestead/prior-possession claim; summary judgment improper |
| Whether Khera preserved alternative defenses (waiver, laches) in the second motion | Hearnes: homestead presumed to continue unless rebutted; burden on Khera to disprove | Khera: asserted waiver/abandonment/laches in earlier motion to bar homestead claim | Court: cannot affirm on grounds not raised in the motion that produced the challenged judgment; those defenses were not presented in second motion |
| Whether Khera’s motion was properly framed as no-evidence vs. traditional summary judgment | Hearnes: the court previously denied summary relief on homestead; evidence required to resolve fact issue | Khera: cited no-evidence standard but relied on record-title argument (traditional) | Court: Khera’s second motion was in substance a traditional motion; standard requires defendant to conclusively disprove an element or prove an affirmative defense |
| Whether Hearnes’ pleading for trespass to try title was deficient for not alleging lost possession | Hearnes: alleged Khera entered and began dumping dirt and intended to fence — sufficient | Khera: argued Hearnes failed to plead loss of possession | Court: Khera did not raise this ground below; in any event, pleadings and facts alleged were sufficient; cannot affirm on unraised ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing summary-judgment evidence and motions)
- Reiter v. Coastal Sales, 382 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1964) (prior possession creates rebuttable presumption of title)
- McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993) (summary-judgment grounds must be specifically stated)
- Timpe Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009) (no-evidence summary-judgment standard)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (what constitutes conclusive proof on summary judgment)
- Willrich (M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich), 28 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam) (deference to nonmovant in summary-judgment review)
- Salomon v. Lesay, 369 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (homestead protection and its purpose)
- Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996) (homestead generally not subject to forced sale for creditors)
- Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. 1993) (cannot affirm summary judgment on ground not presented to trial court)
- Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Rodriguez, 366 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (what constitutes conclusive proof on summary judgment)