239 F. Supp. 3d 1200
C.D. Cal.2017Background
- In 1986 Congress authorized FWS to create an experimental population of California sea otters on San Nicolas Island and required a regulation-based Translocation Plan including a surrounding management zone.
- FWS promulgated the Plan in 1987; the Plan contained termination criteria and immunities for fishermen for incidental take within the management zone.
- In 2012 FWS terminated the Translocation Program and repealed the Plan pursuant to those termination criteria; plaintiffs (four fishing trade groups) sued in 2013 challenging the legality of including termination criteria and the repeal.
- Plaintiffs seek reinstatement of the Plan and the liability immunities; FWS and seven conservation organizations defend the repeal and moved for summary judgment.
- The court framed the legal dispute around (1) standing (including redressability), (2) estoppel/issue preclusion defenses, and (3) whether Pub. L. No. 99-625 prohibits termination of the Plan (Chevron analysis).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — regulated-party theory | Plaintiffs are direct objects of the regulation and therefore presumptively have standing to challenge repeal | Repeal imposes no new regulation; plaintiffs only lost an immunity and thus must show appreciable risk of liability | Denied — plaintiffs failed to show concrete, imminent risk; declarations were too generalized (no specific evidence of likely liability) |
| Standing — environmental/fishery harm (redressability) | Reinstatement would meaningfully advance remedying harm to fisheries from otter predation | Even if reinstated, FWS would still have to find a feasible nonlethal capture method, so relief may not redress harm | Granted — redressability satisfied: a favorable ruling would require FWS to revisit its feasibility inquiry and is a meaningful step toward remedy |
| Estoppel / issue preclusion | Plaintiffs argue FWS is not estopped and at least two plaintiffs were not bound by earlier advocacy or consent decree | FWS points to earlier comments and a 2010 consent decree suggesting some plaintiffs are estopped; prior district decision might preclude relitigation | Court declined to resolve estoppel; because estoppel would not dispose of all plaintiffs, it proceeded to merits and treated prior decision as persuasive, not preclusive |
| Merits — statutory interpretation (Chevron) | Pub. L. No. 99-625 uses mandatory language ("shall include" management zone), so FWS cannot terminate the Plan | Statute uses permissive language ("may...develop and implement"); agency has discretion to implement or cease implementation | Court applied Chevron: at step 1 statute ambiguous on termination; at step 2 deferred to FWS as reasonable — FWS may terminate; denied plaintiffs' summary judgment and granted defendants' cross-motions |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes two-step deferential review for agency statutory interpretation)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements and summary-judgment-stage evidentiary burden for injury-in-fact)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (redressability in environmental cases: plaintiff need only show relief would meaningfully reduce risk of harm)
- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (administrative regulation standing principles)
- Cal. Sea Urchin Comm’n v. Bean, 828 F.3d 1046 (related Ninth Circuit decision addressing discretion to commence and cease the translocation program)