138 F. Supp. 3d 593
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- In August 2013 NYPD detectives South and Sosa investigated suspected cocaine trafficking by German Perez at 275 E. 201st St.; two controlled buys occurred outside the building and Perez was later identified in a car stop by a driver’s license listing Apt. 5F.
- South’s sworn affidavit asserted (1) he saw Perez exit Apt. 5F before the first sale, (2) Sosa observed Perez enter and exit Apt. 5K and also enter Apt. 5F after the second sale, and (3) Perez’s license listed Apt. 5F; a state judge issued no-knock warrants for Apts. 5F and 5K.
- Officers executed the warrants on Aug. 27, 2013: Perez was arrested in 5K and drugs seized; plaintiff Miguelina Calderon, resident of 5F, was handcuffed during the search of her apartment; no contraband was found in 5F.
- Calderon sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging South (and Sosa) knowingly or recklessly made false statements in the warrant affidavit, causing an unlawful search and her false arrest/imprisonment; she also sued the City (Monell) and unnamed Doe officers.
- The court reviewed the Third Amended Complaint (TAC) on a motion to dismiss, applying Franks v. Delaware standards for challenging a warrant based on allegedly false affidavit statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether affidavit contained knowingly or recklessly false statements (Franks first element) | Calderon alleges it was physically impossible for Perez to have entered/exited Apt. 5F: she, her husband, and son always locked a top lock with a unique key/card not given to others and never saw Perez in the apartment. | Defendants argued plaintiff still failed to rule out improbable alternatives (e.g., lockpicking, alarm defeat) and thus did not plausibly allege falsity. | Court: TAC sufficiently pleads factual content (consistent locking, exclusive key possession, no permission or sightings of Perez) to infer knowingly or recklessly false statements. |
| Whether the alleged false statements were material to probable cause (Franks second element) | Removing the statements that Perez entered/exited 5F, the remaining facts (license listing 5F, buys tied to 5K) would not establish nexus to 5F. | Defendants argued the license + authorization to search Perez on premises could justify searching 5F because Perez might be found there. | Court: The allegedly false statements were material; absent them, probable cause to search Apt. 5F would not stand. |
| Whether Calderon plausibly pleaded false arrest/false imprisonment | Calderon says detention during the unlawful search (handcuffed in towel, confined at home) was nonconsensual and not privileged; unlawful search negates Summers privilege. | Defendants argued detention was incident to a search and therefore privileged or not a level of confinement rising to false arrest. | Court: TAC adequately pleads false arrest/false imprisonment; detention was seizure and not privileged because the search was plausibly unlawful. |
| Whether the City is liable under Monell (failure to train/supervise/custom) | Calderon cites a series of prior civil suits and alleged training/supervisory failures to show a custom or deliberate indifference to constitutional violations. | Defendants argued those allegations are conclusory, involve different officers/claims, span many years, and lack adjudications or specific training deficiencies. | Court: Monell claim dismissed for failure to plead a plausible municipal policy, custom, or deliberate indifference; prior suits insufficient and training/supervision allegations too general. |
| Whether claims against John/Jane Doe officers survive | Calderon alleges unnamed officers participated in the search and detention. | Defendants note lack of specific allegations showing personal involvement of any Doe defendant in the challenged misconduct. | Court: Doe claims dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement necessary for § 1983 individual liability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (to set aside warrant, defendant must show affiant knowingly or recklessly made material false statements or omissions)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (presumption of objective reasonableness for warrants but with limits if affidavit was materially false)
- Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (officers may detain occupants during execution of a lawful search warrant)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: legal conclusions not accepted; factual allegations must plausibly state a claim)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (practical, common-sense determination of probable cause; nexus requirement)
- Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search warrants target places and items, not simply persons)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (Monell failure-to-train standard: deliberate indifference required)
- Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 1994) (Franks standard applied in § 1983 civil cases)