Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012

Background

In 2001 a jury convicted Luis G. Cabrera of two counts of first‑degree murder (Rockford Park killings) and recommended death; the trial court imposed death. Cabrera had earlier been convicted of another murder and was serving life.
Cabrera’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; he later filed a Rule 61 postconviction motion asserting multiple claims of constitutional error and ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).
The Superior Court (2015) granted relief only as to the penalty phase, vacating the death sentence for reasons tied to Delaware’s later rulings on capital punishment; it denied the remainder of Cabrera’s postconviction claims. Cabrera appealed the denials; the State declined to press cross‑appeal regarding the vacated death sentence.
Major postconviction claims addressed on appeal included: defense Batson/jury‑selection issues (including defense strikes of Black jurors), failure to suppress a gun seized from Cabrera’s father’s home, late disclosure of belt/buckle evidence and related discovery issues, alleged Brady violations, juror competence/prejudice, Allen charge coercion, and requests to contact jurors and for additional discovery.
The Supreme Court reviewed procedural bars under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, Strickland IAC standards, and recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent on structural errors in postconviction proceedings, and affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of relief except for the vacatur of the death sentence on separate grounds.

Issues

Issue	Cabrera’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Defense Batson / peremptory strikes of Black jurors	Strikes were race‑based; standalone Batson claim or IAC based on counsel’s admission that race was a factor	Claim procedurally defaulted; defendant waived by participating in strikes and failing to object at trial; even as IAC must show prejudice	Standalone Batson barred by Rule 61; IAC claim rejected for failure to show prejudice under Strickland (Weaver controls in postconviction context)
Suppression of gun seized at father’s home	Counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress; police lacked probable cause to seize gun	Gun was voluntarily turned over by owner (father) with consent; suppression motion would have failed; counsel’s strategy reasonable	Claim dismissed: consent search lawful; counsel not ineffective
Late disclosure of belt/buckle evidence and related counsel performance	Late notice denied fair trial; counsel ineffective for failing to preserve objections, challenge lineup, or file Daubert motion	Issue was litigated on direct appeal; defense had time and rebuttal expert; counsel reasonably litigated and rebutted evidence	Claim precluded by Rule 61(i)(4) (previously decided); IAC claims meritless because counsel pursued objections, obtained recess and rebuttal expert
Brady / undisclosed exculpatory/impeachment material and juror issues (including requests to contact jurors)	State failed to disclose impeachment/exculpatory statements (witnesses Powell, Harrigan, Rodriguez); juror misconduct/competence warranted inquiry and juror interviews	Alleged statements not material or not shown to exist; juror concerns were litigated and insufficient; no good cause for postconviction juror contact or wide discovery	Brady claims barred or unsupported; juror misconduct/inquiry and postconviction juror contact denied for lack of new evidence/good cause; discovery requests denied as fishing expedition

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes)
McCollum v. Georgia, 505 U.S. 42 (extends Batson prohibition to defense peremptory strikes)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑pronged ineffective assistance standard)
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (structural errors raised in postconviction require prejudice showing; balances finality and fairness)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutor must disclose material exculpatory/impeachment evidence)