241 F. Supp. 3d 239
D. Mass.2017Background
- On Aug. 8, 2011, Jason Cabot was arrested at Boston Logan Airport after an altercation with Trooper William Lewis; Cabot was charged with assault and battery on a police officer for allegedly chest-bumping Lewis.
- Cabot was booked and subjected to a visual strip-search by Sgt. John Fallon while in custody; he disputes the chest-bump and alleges the arrest and search were unlawful and retaliatory.
- Cabot accepted three months’ unsupervised pretrial probation under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276 § 87 and the charges were dismissed upon successful completion in May 2012.
- Cabot sued Lewis and Fallon pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First and Fourth Amendment theories), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and multiple state tort claims (battery, assault, false arrest/imprisonment, IIED, abuse of process, malicious prosecution); some claims were voluntarily dismissed as to certain defendants.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Cabot’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey because his pretrial-probation disposition is analogous to a conviction; the court evaluated which federal and state claims, if any, are barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Heck bar §1983 claims given disposition by pretrial probation? | Heck does not apply because there was no conviction or sentence. | Heck applies because pretrial probation is a final disposition that would be undermined by success on §1983 claims. | Court: Heck applies to this pretrial-probation disposition on balance (finality, consistency, comity). |
| False arrest / false imprisonment (§1983 & state torts) | Arrest lacked probable cause; claim is independent of malicious prosecution. | Claim would negate an element of the underlying charge (assault/battery) and thus is Heck-barred. | Court: Claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are barred by Heck; summary judgment for defendants. |
| First Amendment retaliatory arrest | Cabot was exercising protected speech (asking for badge/complaint); arrest was motivated by retaliation. | Even if retaliatory, Heck requires negation of probable cause; and qualified immunity applies because it was not clearly established that a probable-cause-supported arrest could violate the First Amendment. | Court: Retaliatory-arrest claim dismissed on qualified immunity grounds (summary judgment for defendants). |
| Fourth Amendment strip-search / excessive-force / related state claims (battery, assault, IIED, abuse of process, malicious prosecution) | Strip-search and any excessive/unreasonable force are distinct constitutional torts not necessarily invalidating the criminal disposition. | Some state claims would require negating probable cause and thus are barred; other claims (e.g., abuse of process, unlawful strip-search) do not depend on invalidating the disposition. | Court: Strip-search claim under §1983 and related state claims (abuse of process, excessive-force/IIED as to non-arrest conduct or search) survive; malicious prosecution and claims requiring lack of probable cause are barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§1983 damages claims that would invalidate a conviction or sentence are barred unless conviction has been invalidated)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (challenges to fact or duration of confinement must proceed via habeas, but damages claims may differ)
- Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (retaliatory-prosecution claims require proof of absence of probable cause)
- Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012) (qualified immunity: not clearly established that Hartman extends to retaliatory arrests supported by probable cause)
- Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998) (Heck can apply even when plaintiff is not in custody and cannot obtain habeas relief)
- Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2006) (Heck analysis depends on the nature of §1983 claims)