C. S. v. Madison Metropolitan School, 34 F.4th 536

C.S., a middle‑school student, alleged that school security assistant Willie Collins sexually abused her throughout her eighth‑grade year (2013–2014); she did not report the abuse until August 2014. The Madison Metropolitan School District was sued under Title IX.
During C.S.’s seventh grade (2012–2013), multiple staff observed and reported concerning interactions between Collins and C.S. (frequent hugs, C.S. attempting to kiss him, spending time in his office).
Principal Deborah Ptak received those reports and, on April 13, 2013, told Collins to limit physical contact, avoid private interactions with C.S., and set strong boundaries; Ptak later observed a significant decrease in contact and received no further reports.
District court granted summary judgment for the school district; the Seventh Circuit took the case en banc to clarify how Gebser’s two‑prong Title IX standard (actual notice + deliberate indifference) applies in such factual settings.
The en banc majority affirmed: it held that actual notice requires knowledge that misconduct rising to the level of sex‑based discrimination has occurred (not mere knowledge of risk), and that Ptak’s response was not deliberately indifferent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the school had "actual notice" under Gebser based on seventh‑grade reports	Ptak knew of grooming‑type conduct (frequent hugs, attempts to kiss, private time) and thus had actual notice of sex discrimination	The reports showed at most concerning conduct/risk, not completed or ongoing sex discrimination that triggers Gebser notice	Court: Actual notice requires knowledge that misconduct rising to the level of sex discrimination occurred; on these facts the court assumed arguendo notice but did not find it dispositive
Whether the school's response amounted to deliberate indifference (Gebser prong two)	Ptak’s limited admonition was insufficient given the risk; failure to do more was deliberate indifference	Ptak confronted Collins, set boundaries, observed compliance and decreased contact; her response was reasonable under the circumstances	Held: Response was not deliberately indifferent; summary judgment for the district affirmed
Whether knowledge of risk alone can support institutional Title IX liability	Knowledge of risk (or grooming indications) should trigger a school’s duty to act and can support liability if ignored	Gebser forbids liability based solely on risk; liability requires notice of past/ongoing discrimination and an official decision not to remedy it	Held: Risk alone is not actionable; risk is relevant to the adequacy of the remedial response, but not a substitute for actual notice of discrimination

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (establishes Title IX two‑prong standard: actual notice to an official with authority and deliberate indifference)
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (defines actionable student‑harassment as conduct so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives access to educational opportunities)
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (recognizes an implied private cause of action for Title IX and availability of damages)
Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (discusses distinction between actual knowledge of misconduct and knowledge of risk; includes hypothetical about a known serial harasser)
Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2020) (holds a school’s reasonable response can avoid liability even if harm later occurs)
Galster v. Doe, 768 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2014) (explains that actual knowledge can be established by witnessing or receiving a report of the incident)