221 A.3d 154
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2019Background
- Plaintiff filed for a SASPA restraining order after a sexual encounter with defendant; parties do not dispute the sexual contact occurred.
- On the night in question plaintiff and her friend voluntarily consumed substantial alcohol at two bars and a residence; bartenders cut off service to the friend.
- Defendant (the friend’s cousin) drove the women to his home, where additional drinking occurred; the sexual encounter occurred in defendant’s garage.
- Plaintiff testified she was extremely intoxicated, feared defendant (physically larger), said words to the effect “I do not want this,” and only complied out of fear; defendant testified the encounter was consensual.
- Trial judge found the parties’ accounts equally plausible, found plaintiff “extremely voluntarily intoxicated” and “visibly intoxicated,” but did not apply the criminal-law “prostration of the faculties” standard when concluding plaintiff was temporarily incapable of consenting.
- Appellate court interpreted SASPA’s statutory language on mental incapacity, held voluntary intoxication can support incapacity, adopted the “prostration of the faculties” standard, and remanded for further factual findings/applicability of that standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SASPA requires intoxication be involuntary (i.e., "administered without prior knowledge or consent") to establish mental incapacity | Voluntary intoxication can render a person incapable of consenting and thus satisfy SASPA | Statutory text requires involuntary administration; voluntary drinking cannot establish mental incapacity under the statute | The qualifying phrase modifies only the last antecedent ("other substance"); voluntary intoxication may support a finding of incapacity under SASPA |
| What degree of intoxication is required to prove incapacity to consent | Lesser levels of intoxication or inability to recall details may suffice | A high threshold is required; mere drinking is insufficient | Court adopts the criminal-law "prostration of the faculties" standard—intoxication must be so severe it renders the person incapable of forming consent |
| Whether the trial judge applied the correct legal standard and made sufficient findings | Judge found plaintiff temporarily incapable due to extreme intoxication | Judge’s factual findings were equivocal; plaintiff failed to prove nonconsent | Remand: judge did not apply "prostration" standard; further findings or reopened evidence required to assess whether faculties were prostrated |
| Whether appellate court should resolve SASPA’s second prong (future risk) now | Plaintiff argued risk existed | Defendant argued evidence insufficient | Court declined to decide second-prong claim on appeal and left it to the trial judge on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- R.L.U. v. J.P., 457 N.J. Super. 129 (App. Div. 2018) (distinguishing SASPA from domestic-violence remedies)
- In re M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992) (consent can be inferred from circumstances; must be freely given)
- State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42 (1986) (adopting the "prostration of the faculties" intoxication standard in criminal context)
- State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008) (applying the last-antecedent rule in statutory construction)
- Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469 (2016) (burden of proof and preponderance standard analysis)
- Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) (trial-court factfinding and appellate deference)