C.R. England v. Swift Transportation
2019 UT 8
Utah2019Background
- England, a trucking company, requires driver-trainees to sign nine-month exclusive employment contracts to protect training investment; it alleges Swift knowingly recruited and induced England drivers to breach those contracts.
- England sued Swift for intentional interference with contract; Swift moved for summary judgment arguing England had not shown the element of "improper means."
- The federal district court certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court because Utah caselaw appeared unclear whether "improper means" is an element of the tort and what it encompasses.
- England urged overruling St. Benedict’s (which applied Leigh’s test to existing contracts) and returning to Bunnell’s rule that wrongful inducement is actionable unless done with just cause or excuse.
- Utah Supreme Court considered whether to overturn St. Benedict’s under Eldridge factors and whether to define what constitutes "improper means."
- The Court ultimately reaffirmed that "improper means" is an element of intentional interference with contract and clarified that it means conduct contrary to law or violating an objective, industry-wide standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "improper means" is an element of intentional interference with contract | England: St. Benedict’s was wrongly decided; follow Bunnell—no improper-means element required as part of prima facie case | Swift: Leigh and St. Benedict’s require improper means as an element | Court: Reaffirmed St. Benedict’s; "improper means" is an element |
| If retained, who bears burden to prove impropriety | England: Bunnell supports prima facie approach or at least ambiguity to eliminate improper-means requirement | Swift: Utah caselaw supports requiring plaintiff to show improper means | Court: Left "improper means" as part of plaintiff's prima facie showing per St. Benedict’s precedent |
| What constitutes "improper means" | England: inducement of breach alone should suffice as improper means | Swift: Must be conduct contrary to law or violating recognized standards | Court: "Improper means" = conduct contrary to law (statute, regulation, recognized common-law rule) or violation of an objective, industry-wide standard; mere inducement/breach alone is not enough |
| How to prove an industry standard violation | England: argued broader approaches | Swift: sought clarity resembling California's sanction-linked rule | Court: Adopted Walker approach—plaintiff must show an external, objective, industry-wide standard (expert testimony, codes, uniform practices) to prove violation |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) (applied Leigh test including "improper means" to existing-contract interference)
- Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) (adopted three-part test for interference with economic relations and defined "improper means")
- Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962) (earlier rule emphasizing lack of justification or excuse for liability for inducing breach)
- Eldridge v. Johndrow, 345 P.3d 553 (Utah 2015) (articulated factors for overruling precedent and disavowed improper-purpose prong)
- Walker v. Anderson-Oliver Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 309 P.3d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (explained proof required to establish an objective, industry-wide standard)