C Mary Armijo v. Bronson Methodist Hospital
345 Mich App 254
Mich. Ct. App.2023Background
- Mary Armijo sued multiple medical defendants; appeals concerned tolling of statutes of limitations by Michigan Supreme Court administrative orders issued during the COVID-19 pandemic (AO 2020-3 and AO 2020-18).
- The administrative orders effectively tolled otherwise applicable statutes of limitations from March 10, 2020, through June 20, 2020.
- The lead opinion resolved the appeals without deciding the constitutionality of those administrative orders; Judge Riordan concurred but wrote separately.
- Riordan’s concurrence explains the Court need not decide constitutionality here but urges that the orders’ validity warrants full consideration in a future case.
- He argues the Supreme Court’s rulemaking power under Const 1963, art VI, § 5 does not permit creating or modifying substantive law such as statutes of limitations.
- He notes equitable tolling might authorize some tolling (per Devillers) but questions whether these administrative orders went beyond permissible equitable tolling (citing Browning dissent) and concludes defendants have a strong constitutional argument.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Michigan Supreme Court could toll legislatively enacted statutes of limitations via administrative orders during COVID-19 | Tolling was warranted to ensure access to courts during the pandemic | The Court lacked authority under art VI, § 5 to modify substantive law (statutes of limitations); orders thus unconstitutional | Concurrence: not decided here; suggests strong argument they were unauthorized and should be addressed in a future case |
| Whether statutes of limitations are substantive, limiting the Court’s rulemaking power | Tolling preserves access without altering substantive rights | Statutes of limitations are substantive; rulemaking power cannot abrogate or modify them | Court cited precedent that statutes of limitations are substantive; concurrence emphasizes McDougall and Gladych support this limit |
| Whether equitable tolling or judicial equitable powers could justify the administrative tolling | Pandemic conditions justified tolling under equitable doctrines to preserve access | Administrative orders were not limited to court closures and thus exceeded equitable tolling authority | Concurrence notes equitable tolling may apply in some circumstances (Devillers) but questions its applicability here and recommends future review |
Key Cases Cited
- McDougall v. Schanz, 597 NW2d 148 (Mich. 1999) (Court’s rulemaking power cannot adopt rules that alter substantive law)
- Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 664 NW2d 705 (Mich. 2003) (statutes of limitations are substantive in nature)
- Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 702 NW2d 539 (Mich. 2005) (recognizes equitable tolling under judicial equitable powers)
- Shannon v. Cross, 222 NW 168 (Mich. 1928) (Legislature defines public policy and substantive law)
- Browning v. Buko, 979 NW2d 196 (Mich. 2022) (dissent noting equitable tolling justified only for court closures and expressing concern about broad administrative tolling)
- Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (U.S. 1934) (emergency does not expand governmental powers or remove constitutional limits)