GLADYCH v NEW FAMILY HOMES, INC
Docket No. 119948
Supreme Court of Michigan
July 1, 2003
Rehearing denied 469 Mich 1222.
468 MICH 594
Argued December 12, 2002 (Calendar No. 16).
In an opinion by Chief Justice CORRIGAN, joined by Justices TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff failed to toll the period of limitations pursuant to
While
In this case, although plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of
Justice WEAVER, joined by Justices CAVANAGH and KELLY, cоncurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that although she agreed with the majority‘s interpretation of
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — TOLLING PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS — COMMENCING CIVIL ACTION.
To toll a period of limitations in a civil action requires both the threshold of filing a complaint and complying with the additionаl statutory requirements (
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, P.C. (by B. A. Tyler and Patrick Burkett), for the plaintiff-appellee.
Harvey Kruse, P.C. (by James Sukkar and Julie Nichols), for the defendant-appellant.
CORRIGAN, C.J. This case concerns the proper interpretation of
Plaintiff alleged that he was injured on January 23, 1996, while employed by defendant. Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 22, 1999, one day before the three-year limitations period expired.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff‘s claim because plaintiff did not serve defendant or place the summons with an officer for service before the limitations period expired, as required by
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed:
Because plaintiff filed this action before the three-year limitations period expired, it was timely filed. Goniwicha v Harkai, 393 Mich 255 . . . (1974); Buscaino[, supra]. Because the limitations period had not expired before plaintiff filed suit, the tolling provisions of
§ 5856 were not implicated.1
Defendant moved for rehearing, arguing that Buscaino should be overruled. The Court denied defendant‘s motion.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 59; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). Questions of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Oade v Jackson Nat‘l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 NW2d 126 (2001).
III. DISCUSSION
When interpreting statutes, our obligation is to discern and give effect to the Legislature‘s intent as expressed in the statutory language. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000). If the language is unambiguous, “we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.” Id. “Similarly, courts may not speculate about an unstated purpose where the unambiguous text plainly reflects the intent of the Legislature.” Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).
A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
Section 5805 does not provide, however, that the statute of limitations somehow becomes irrelevant once the complaint is filed. In fact, the plain language of the statute extends no further than the filing of the complaint. If, as concluded in Buscaino, supra at 481, the mere filing of a complaint under
Section 5856 provides that the statute of limitations is tolled only if (1) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on defendant, (2) jurisdiction is otherwise acquired over defendant, (3) the complaint is filed and a copy of the
In other words, if one does not perform any actions specified by
The inherent flaw in the Buscaino analysis lies in the fact that Buscaino was not concerned with the plain language of the statute. Rather, the Court in Buscaino, operating under the erroneous belief that statutes of limitations were merely “procedural” in
This Court has since clarified the distinction between statutes regarding matters of “practice and procedure” and those regarding substantive law in McDougall, supra. If the statute concеrns a matter that is purely procedural and pertains only to the administration of the courts, the court rule would control. Id. at 26-27. If, however, the statute concerns a “‘principle of public policy, having as its basis something other than court administration . . . the [court] rule should yield.’ ” Id. at 31, quoting Joiner & Miller, Rules of practice and procedure: A study of judicial rule making, 55 Mich L R 623, 635 (1957).
Statutes regarding periods of limitations are substantive in nature. In Nielsen v Barnett, 440 Mich 1, 8-9; 485 NW2d 666 (1992), this Court noted the various policies underlying statutеs of limitations:
By enacting a statute of limitations, the Legislature determines the reasonable period of time given to a plaintiff to pursue a claim. The policy reasons behind statutes of limitations include: the prompt recovery of damages, penalizing plaintiffs who are not industrious in pursuing claims, security against stale demands, relieving defendants’ fear of litigation, prevention of fraudulent claims, and a remedy for general inconveniences resulting from delay. . . . [Citations omitted.]
Therefore, after McDougall, it is clear that, to the extent
Further, it should be noted that although the Court in Buscaino relied in part on the Committee Comment to
Even the Committee Comment recognizes this function of MCLA § 600.5856 . . . . The Committee Comment reads:
“In the event of the dismissal, on some ground other than on the merits (as for example—lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) of an action in which jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired, the period of time from the time of service or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant until dismissal will not count as a part of the time of limitation, for during such time the statute has been tolled. Subsections (1) and (2).” [Buscaino, supra at 482-483.]
Section [600.5856] is designed to avoid the problems which have commonly arisen in those jurisdictions lacking such a section, as to precisely at what point the statutes of limitation are tolled. The question of whether mere filing of the complaint constituted commencement of an action to stop the running of the statutes of limitation was presented to the Federal Advisory Committee on Rules in their preliminary meetings in 1937, but was left unanswered. Consequently many difficult problems of interpretation arose in federal courts, with various results. One court held that the mere filing of the complaint was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Bomar v Keyes, 162 F2d 136 [(CA 2, 1947)]. On the other hand, it has been held that an action is commenced by the filing of the complaint so long as process is issued in due course with intent that it be served. Jacobson v Coon, 165 F2d 565 [(CA 6, 1948)].
As yet the United States Supreme Court has not directly passed on the question insofar as it relates to federal questions. The court has held that local law will govern diversity cases on this matter. Existing Michigan law as stated in Korby v Sosnowski, 339 Mich 705 [64 NW2d 683 (1953)], holds that an action at law for damages is commenced when the summons is in good faith placed in the hands of an officer for service although service is not actually made until after expiration of the statutes of limitation. It is submitted that permitting the determination of when an action is commenced as to toll the statutes of limitations ought not to depend on a particular court‘s interpretation of such tenuous words and phrases as “intent,” “due course,” “reasonable diligence,” etc. Therefore, the instant section has been included in the statute of limitations in order that the question might be definitely settled without resort to case law.
The mere act of filing a complaint should not toll the statute, as а matter of policy. The section does not accept the
theory of the case as cited above. It is unrealistic to argue that defendants are put on notice of a lawsuit merely because a public court record exists to that effect. The defendant has a vital interest in being informed of the pendency of an action against him. Thus we have sought to enable a plaintiff to avoid the bar of a statute of limitation by tаking the proper steps of establishing a court record (filing the complaint) and complying with the requirements of a method reasonably calculated to give a defendant notice. At the same time, we have required the plaintiff to prosecute his action diligently by the imposition of a maximum tolling period. The rights of both parties are thus protected. The plaintiff has the option of using some other method of getting jurisdiction over the defendant. And, if he does use some other method of getting jurisdiction over the defendant, the period of limitation will be tolled at the time jurisdiction over the defendant is accomplished.
The section does not constitute any radical departure from presently accepted principles, but it prescribes a definite procedure to be utilized wherein counsel are informed of the necessary steps which will guarantee the tolling of the statute of limitation. The adoption of this section will greatly increase predictability.
Under subsection (1) the statutes of limitations are tolled when the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant. Under subsection (2) the statutes of limitations are tolled when jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained by some other method. The statutes of limitations are also tolled when the complaint is filed and a сopy of the summons and complaint are in good faith placed in the hands of an officer for service as per subsection (3). Thus a plaintiff need not actually have secured the accomplishment of service or have otherwise obtained jurisdiction over the defendant in order to preserve his cause of action. It should be noted, however, that under subsection (3) the statutes are tolled for a maximum period of ninety days. Thе statute again begins to run when the 90-day period has expired, and may not be tolled again until the service is made or jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained by some other method. It should also be noted
that in order to secure the benefits of subsection (3), a copy of the summons and complaint must be placed in the hands of an “officer,” and not just any person of suitable age and discretion.
In summary, a method has been provided whereby a рlaintiff, by taking the proper steps, can toll the statute of limitation on his cause of action for a maximum period of ninety days. The establishment of a maximum toll period should eliminate the litigation-provoking questions as to whether or not a plaintiff “intended” to “diligently prosecute” his suit, as bearing on the issue of how long the statute could be tolled by placing a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith in the hands of an officer for service.
Example: Suppose a two year statute of limitation. P files a complaint one year and eleven months after the cause of action arose. On the same day a copy of the summons and complaint are in good faith placed in the hands of an officer for service. Actual service is made 100 days later. Can D plead the two-year statute as a bar to the action?
No—the statute was tolled for 90 days when P filed а complaint and in good faith placed a copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of an officer for service. At the end of the 90-day period, the statute again started to run—at this point P still had 30 days in which service could be made (the two-year statute minus one year and eleven months) and service was actually made on the tenth of these 30 days left. If the service had been made 121 days after the filing of the complaint D could have pleaded the statute of limitations as a bar to the action.
In the event of the dismissal, on some ground other than on the merits (as for example—lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter) of an action in which jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired, the period of time from the time of service or the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant until dismissal will not count as a part of the time of limitation, for during such time the statute has been tollеd. Subsections (1) and (2).
IV. APPLICATION
In overruling Buscaino, we are mindful of the effect our decision may have. We recently addressed the application of decisions overruling prior precedent in Pohutski, supra at 695-696:
As this Court noted in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 665; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), quoting Williams [v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 265-266; 111 NW2d 1 (1961)]:
“This Court has overruled prior precedent many times in the past. In each such instance the Court must take into account the total situаtion confronting it and seek a just
and realistic solution of the problems occasioned by the change.”
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Although the general rule is that judicial decisions are given full retroactive effect, Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 426 Mich 223, 240; 393 NW2d 847 (1986), a more flexible approach is warranted where injustice might result from full retroactivity. Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997).
Although this opinion gives effect to the intent of the Legislature that may be reasonably inferred from the unambiguous text of
Further, there has been extensive reliance on Buscaino‘s interpretation of
In this case, although plaintiff satisfied the threshold requirement of
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that the unambiguous language of
TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.
WEAVER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority‘s interpretation of
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., concurred with WEAVER, J.