C. Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez
A17D0237
| Ga. Ct. App. | Feb 7, 2017Background
- Board of Regents members (Board Members) denied in-state tuition to several DACA recipients under BOR residency rules and OCGA § 20-3-66(d).
- DACA recipients argued they are "lawfully present" under the federal DACA program and sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board Members to grant in-state tuition.
- Board Members moved to dismiss, arguing DACA confers only temporary "lawful presence" for immigration enforcement purposes and does not create substantive immigration status or entitle recipients to state benefits; they also asserted BOR discretion to define in-state status.
- DACA recipients moved for summary judgment; the superior court denied dismissal and granted summary judgment for the recipients, ordering the Board Members to apply the federal definition of "lawful presence" and grant in-state tuition.
- The issues implicate federal preemption and the Supremacy Clause, bringing the matter within the Georgia Supreme Court’s constitutional-question jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DACA’s "lawful presence" status precludes BOR’s denial of in-state tuition | DACA recipients: DACA makes them lawfully present; state must accept federal definition and grant in-state tuition | Board: DACA grants limited, nonimmigrant benefits only for enforcement; BOR may define residency and deny in-state status | Superior court: Federal definition of "lawful presence" applies; Board must grant in-state tuition (case transferred to GA Supreme Court) |
| Whether mandamus can compel BOR to follow federal definition | Recipients: Mandamus warranted to enforce public duty to apply federal law | Board: BOR’s statutory and rulemaking authority bars mandamus | Superior court granted mandamus relief in favor of recipients |
| Whether BOR rules and OCGA § 20-3-66(d) authorize denying DACA recipients in-state classification | Recipients: State law cannot override federal recognition of lawful presence | Board: State statute and BOR policy legitimately restrict in-state classification to recognized immigration categories | Superior court treated federal preemption issue as controlling and ordered application of federal definition |
| Whether the issue is within Georgia Supreme Court jurisdiction (constitutional question) | N/A (party positions implicit) | N/A | Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court under its constitutional-question jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Babies Right Start v. Ga. Dept. of Pub. Health, 293 Ga. 553 (2013) (preemption question brings case under Georgia Supreme Court constitutional-question jurisdiction)
- Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (federal benefits and preemption principles)
- Ariz. Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016) (DACA-related federal preemption and enforcement context)
- Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Co., 267 Ga. 177 (1996) (Georgia Supreme Court has ultimate responsibility for determining appellate jurisdiction)
- Ward v. McFall, 277 Ga. 649 (2004) (trial court refusal to apply state statute inconsistent with federal regulation invokes Supremacy Clause)