Byron Perry v. State of Mississippi
233 So. 3d 750
| Miss. | 2017Background
- In May 2010 Byron Perry allegedly shot at Shetamarah Willis in her home, struggled with her (causing a burn), and left; shell casings and unfired rounds were recovered and Perry surrendered the next day. He was indicted later in 2010 and tried in July 2015.
- Jury convicted Perry of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon by a felon; the trial court found him a habitual offender and imposed consecutive maximum terms (20 years for assault; 10 years for the weapon count) with no parole/probation.
- The five-year-plus interval between indictment/arraignment and trial included many defense-requested continuances (investigative time, counsel illness/resignation, mental evaluation/competency proceedings) and some unexplained delays.
- The State amended the indictment during the delay to allege habitual-offender status based on two earlier felony convictions (Cobb County, GA and Lowndes County, MS, both 2003).
- The Lowndes County sentencing order recited a three-year sentence "including the Regimented Inmate Discipline Program (RID)" and provided for resentencing if the defendant successfully completed RID; the State introduced that order and a Georgia sentence order at the habitual-offender hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Perry's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether constitutional speedy-trial right was violated by ~5-year delay | Delay was presumptively prejudicial; reversal required | Most delay was caused by defense continuances and mental-evaluation proceedings; minimal state delay; no actual prejudice | No violation — Barker factors weighed against Perry; good cause apparent from record |
| Whether statutory speedy-trial (Miss. Code §99-17-1) was violated (270-day rule) | Waived arraignment Oct 2010; not tried within 270 days | Defense continuances were granted for good cause and tolled the 270-day clock | No violation — continuances reduced the running time; 198 days remained |
| Whether State proved habitual-offender status beyond a reasonable doubt | Lowndes sentencing order was indeterminate due to RID language; State failed to prove defendant was sentenced to >=1 year | Sentencing order facially imposed three years; RID provision did not make the three-year sentence contingent on completion; State need not prove negative (failure to complete RID) | Majority: No plain error — Lowndes order unambiguously imposed three years; habitual-offender finding affirmed. Concurring/dissent: would vacate enhancement because order was ambiguous and State failed to prove sentence >=1 year beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether failure to object to habitual-offender proof bars appellate review | (implicit) procedural bar to challenge | (implicit) issue forfeited absent plain-error review | Court reviews for plain error; majority finds no plain error; concurrence finds plain error on habitual-offender proof |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (Sup. Ct.) (four-factor balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512 (Miss. 1998) (state bears burden to show good cause for trial delay)
- Rowsey v. State, 188 So.3d 486 (Miss. 2015) (when trial court fails to conduct adequate speedy-trial hearing, appellate court may do de novo review if good cause is apparent)
- Conner v. State, 138 So.3d 143 (Miss. 2014) (state must prove habitual-offender elements beyond a reasonable doubt; bifurcated approach to guilt and habitual status)
- Reynolds v. State, 784 So.2d 929 (Miss. 2001) (written continuance orders constitute judicial determinations of good cause for tolling statutory speedy-trial clock)
- Jackson v. State, 381 So.2d 1040 (Miss. 1980) (sentence of one year or more may be used for habitual-offender enhancement even if later suspended)