Byron David v. Donald King, 109 F.4th 653

The case involved a bankruptcy proceeding in which Byron David filed for Chapter 7, later converted to Chapter 11, and ultimately to Chapter 13.
Donald King was the trustee for both Chapter 7 and subsequently Chapter 11, and retained a law firm while serving in these roles.
King properly applied to employ the law firm during Chapter 7, but did not seek court approval for the firm's employment during the Chapter 11 phase; the law firm nonetheless performed work.
After the case converted to Chapter 13—and King's role as trustee ended—King sought retroactive (post-hoc) approval under § 327(a) for the law firm’s employment during his tenure as Chapter 11 trustee, so that the firm could be compensated for its work during that period.
The bankruptcy and district courts approved the retroactive application, restricting compensation to work performed while King was trustee, and David appealed.
The appellate court reversed, holding that § 327(a) does not allow a former trustee to file an application after their service has ended, even for work performed during their tenure.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can a former trustee apply post-hoc under § 327(a) for professionals' employment for work done while trustee?	David: Only a current trustee may apply under § 327(a); authority ends at conversion per § 348(e).	King: Bankruptcy courts have equitable discretion and routinely grant after-the-fact approval when services were performed in good faith.	No, only the current trustee may apply; a former trustee lacks authority after service ends.
Does equity permit after-the-fact approval for professionals' employment by a former trustee?	David: Statutory language is controlling; equity can't override it.	King: Equity should allow compensation for good-faith, court-aware work benefiting the estate.	No, equity cannot override the clear statutory limitation of § 327(a).
Did the bankruptcy court’s conversion order implicitly authorize King’s application?	David: No, the order did not and could not override statutory text.	King: The order authorized seeking approval for compensation, including for professionals.	No, the order did not override § 327(a)'s requirements.
Are post-conversion tasks enough to let a former trustee apply for professional employment?	David: Only current trustee can act under § 327(a), regardless of lingering duties.	King: Some post-conversion duties remain, justifying professional retention.	No, lingering duties do not extend § 327(a) authority after trustee's term ends.

Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (explains the purpose of bankruptcy's fresh start principle)
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (professional compensation requires court approval under § 327(a))
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 587 U.S. 370 (2019) (explains estate's role in bankruptcy)
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010) (describes operation of Chapter 13 bankruptcy)
Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015) (discusses confirmation and effect of Chapter 13 plan)
In re Marvel Ent. Grp., Inc., 140 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1998) (trustee appointment is the exception in Chapter 11)
Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43 (2002) (bankruptcy courts apply principles of equity)