240 A.3d 829
D.C.2020Background
- Widmon Butler, an MPD claims specialist and attorney, emailed the Office of Risk Management in Aug. 2013 from his MPD account to represent a coworker, Josephine Jackson, raising conflict-of-interest and unauthorized-access concerns.
- ORM alerted MPD on Sept. 12, 2013; IAD (Sergeant Woodson) opened an inquiry, MPD placed Butler on administrative leave Sept. 19, 2013, and IAD emailed the USAO on Sept. 18 about possible "double-dipping."
- MPD referred the matter to the USAO on Oct. 1, 2013; the USAO declined prosecution on June 2, 2014. MPD issued a notice of proposed termination to Butler on Oct. 6, 2014, charging misfeasance, misuse of government property, and making false statements to IAD.
- OEA Administrative Judge found Butler unlawfully accessed Jackson’s medical records and lied to IAD, remanded for penalty consideration; on remand MPD produced a second prior misfeasance and the AJ (initial decision) upheld termination.
- OEA Board and Superior Court affirmed the termination but used differing rationales about when tolling under D.C. Code § 5-1031(b) began and ended; the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court judgment and remanded to OEA for further factual and legal analysis of tolling between Sept. 12 and Oct. 1, 2013.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under §5-1031 (90‑day rule/tolling) | Butler: termination untimely because 90‑day clock ran from Sept. 12, 2013 and was not tolled until USAO referral on Oct. 1 | MPD: clock tolled from Sept. 12 because MPD/IAD treated matter as a criminal investigation; tolling continued through USAO declination | Remanded to OEA: appellate court could not sustain OEA/AJ/Board reasoning; whether MPD’s inquiry from Sept. 12–Oct. 1 was a "criminal investigation" requires OEA factfinding and statutory interpretation; remand ordered |
| Deference/standard of review for OEA interpretation | Butler: N/A (argues untimely) | MPD: court should adopt MPD’s legal view that tolling begins when agency takes a concrete investigative step | Court: ordinarily defers to OEA’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes; directed OEA to address meaning of "subject of a criminal investigation" in the first instance |
| Credibility / false statements to IAD | Butler: denied reviewing records; argues AJ erred finding he lied | MPD: evidence (records open >50 minutes) supports finding of untruthfulness | Held: AJ’s credibility finding supported by substantial evidence and affirmed |
| Reopening record / post‑remand evidence | Butler: OEA improperly accepted MPD evidence after evidentiary hearing and remand | MPD: AJ had authority to reopen record prior to initial decision and consider penalty evidence | Held: OEA reasonably interpreted its rules to allow reopening before issuance of initial decision; consideration of additional penalty evidence was permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia Fire & Med. Servs. Dep’t v. District of Columbia Off. of Emp. Appeals, 986 A.2d 419 (D.C. 2010) (standard of review and deference to OEA interpretations)
- Brown v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 83 A.3d 739 (D.C. 2014) (agency should interpret ambiguous statute before court reaches it)
- Apartment & Off. Bldg. Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 129 A.3d 925 (D.C. 2016) (agency action ordinarily cannot be upheld on grounds the agency did not rely on)
- Murchison v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Pub. Works, 813 A.2d 203 (D.C. 2002) (reviewing court cannot make factual findings the agency failed to make)
- Rocha-Guzmán v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 170 A.3d 170 (D.C. 2017) (credibility determinations entitled to great weight)
- District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Off. of Emp. Appeals, 883 A.2d 124 (D.C. 2005) (discussed de novo review of a related statutory phrase in a prior version)
- District of Columbia Off. of Tax & Revenue v. BAE Sys. Enter. Sys., Inc., 56 A.3d 477 (D.C. 2012) (deference to agency interpretation of its own regulations)
- In re O.L., 584 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 1990) (appellee may support judgment on alternative record grounds without cross‑appeal)