Background - Two beneficiaries (Burton; Olivar) were denied long‑term disability benefits under ERISA plans funded and administered via insurance policies (Unum; Standard). - Each sued the named ERISA plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) but served only the U.S. Department of Labor Secretary pursuant to § 1132(d)(1); the Secretary did not forward service to the plans’ designated agents. - Default judgments were entered against the plans; years later the plans moved under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) to set aside the defaults for lack of proper service. - Trial courts vacated the defaults and then granted summary judgment to the plans, reasoning the insurers (not the plans) were the proper defendants because only the insurers determined eligibility and paid benefits. - The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve: (1) whether “individual” in § 1132(d)(1) includes corporations for service‑of‑process purposes; (2) whether void judgments for lack of service may be attacked anytime; and (3) whether insurers or plans are the proper defendants when insurers alone decide and pay claims. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---|---|---| | Whether § 1132(d)(1)’s reference to an “individual” as agent for service permits service on Labor Secretary when plan designates a corporation as administrator/agent | "Individual" means a natural person, so serving the Secretary is proper when the summary plan description does not name a natural person | "Individual" can include a corporation; ERISA expressly allows corporations as plan administrators/agents, so Secretary service is only a fallback when no agent (person or corporation) is designated | "Individual" in § 1132(d)(1) includes corporations; Secretary service is only proper when the summary plan description designates no agent (natural person or corporation) | | Whether default judgments entered without proper service are void and may be set aside despite delay | Plans waited unreasonably long (years) to move to vacate; motions were not within a "reasonable time" under C.R.C.P. 60(b) | A judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time; reasonable‑time limitation does not apply to void judgments for lack of service | A default entered without personal jurisdiction is void and may be set aside at any time; trial courts correctly vacated the defaults | | Whether an insurance‑funded ERISA plan or the insurer is the proper defendant in a § 1132(a)(1)(B) benefits suit when the insurer alone administers and pays claims | The plan is always a proper defendant under the statutory text and prior precedent | When the insurer alone determines eligibility and is obligated to pay, the insurer (obligor) is the proper defendant; the plan has no liability or assets | Where the plan is merely an insured vehicle (no assets, policy is governing instrument, insurer alone decides/pay), the insurer — not the plan — is the proper defendant | | Effect of holding on the default judgments and summary judgment rulings | Vacating defaults and dismissing plans is improper if Secretary service was sufficient | Vacating defaults was proper and plans were correct non‑parties because insurers are obligors | Secretary service was insufficient; defaults were void and properly vacated; insurers are proper defendants; summary judgment for plans affirmed | ### Key Cases Cited Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (U.S. 2012) ("individual" need not always mean natural person; context matters) Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (U.S. 1998) (interpretation of "individual" as person where contrary reading would be absurd) Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (U.S. 2015) (identical statutory language can carry different meanings in different contexts) Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 2002) (plan is proper defendant under § 1132(a)(1)(B)) Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (insurer can be a logical defendant when it alone denies claims and pays benefits) Larson v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 723 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2013) (insurer is proper defendant where it decides eligibility and owes benefits) Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310 (Colo. 2010) (default judgment without personal jurisdiction is a nullity) Weaver Constr. Co. v. Dist. Court, 545 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1976) (service defects deprive court of personal jurisdiction) * Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 330 P.2d 1116 (Colo. 1958) (void judgments may be attacked at any time)