Burton v. Attorney General
210 F. Supp. 3d 203
| D.D.C. | 2016Background
- Sandra Burton, a long‑term HUD Contract Specialist, filed a 2008 EEO complaint alleging race discrimination and entered a 2009 EEO settlement that moved her and allowed telework.
- After Elie Stowe became Burton's direct supervisor in June 2010, Burton alleges Stowe learned of the prior EEO activity, encouraged Burton to resign, and began escalating disciplinary actions against her.
- Between late 2010 and 2011 Burton was placed on administrative/enforced leave, suspended for 5 days, given a counseling memorandum, suspended for 30 days, and ultimately faced a Proposal to Remove; Burton resigned while on indefinite leave and later received a right‑to‑sue letter.
- Burton filed a Title VII retaliation suit alleging discrete adverse actions and a retaliatory hostile work environment, seeking compensatory damages and fees; HUD moved for summary judgment.
- The district court denied summary judgment, concluding that material factual disputes (credibility of Stowe’s accounts, temporal proximity, alleged fabrication of incidents, procedural irregularities) could allow a jury to find retaliatory motive and proximate cause under a cat’s‑paw theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Burton suffered materially adverse actions | Burton: administrative leave, suspensions, counseling, and constructive discharge (resignation) were materially adverse | HUD: disciplinary actions were for legitimate insubordination; resignation presumed voluntary when removal was imminent | Court: Material adverse actions established; constructive discharge could be found by a jury under Aliotta (objective test) |
| Whether adverse actions were motivated by retaliation for protected EEO activity | Burton: Stowe learned of prior EEO activity, quickly pressured/harassed her, fabricated incidents; temporal proximity and inconsistencies support inference of retaliation | HUD: Valid, non‑retaliatory reasons (insubordination); some supervisors were not targets of prior EEO activity so no motive | Court: Credible competing evidence permits a jury to find Stowe's retaliatory motive (temporal proximity, alleged fabrication, requests for confidential settlement, inconsistent statements) |
| Whether a supervisor’s animus can be imputed where decisionmakers lacked animus (cat’s paw) | Burton: Stowe originated reports, proposed discipline, and her accounts were the factual basis for subsequent decisions, making her animus a proximate cause | HUD: Ultimate decisionmakers (Bryon, Blocker) lacked retaliatory animus; thus liability improper | Court: Cat’s‑paw theory applies; a jury could find Stowe’s animus proximately caused the adverse actions because decisionmakers relied on her accounts and were not independent |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Burton: disputed facts (he‑said/she‑said, procedural irregularities, evidence of motive) preclude summary judgment | HUD: evidence supports discipline as non‑retaliatory and no proof of pretext or motive | Held: Summary judgment denied — genuine disputes of material fact remain for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (movant bears burden to show absence of genuine dispute)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination evidence)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (cat’s‑paw proximate cause principle)
- Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085 (evidence to show pretext; cat’s‑paw in retaliation context)
- Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556 (constructive discharge can overcome presumption of voluntary resignation)
- Keyes v. District of Columbia, 372 F.3d 434 (presumption that resignation in face of imminent removal is voluntary)
- Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329 (summary judgment standards in D.C. Circuit)