Burkey, D. v. CCX, Inc.
106 A.3d 736
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2014Background
- On June 18, 2007 Burkey injured his hand operating a warper machine previously manufactured by West Point and later sold by CCX to New York Wire on June 30, 2005 "as-is, where-is."
- Burkey sued West Point and Hanover (original defendants); Hanover joined CCX as an additional defendant; strict liability and breach of warranty claims against CCX were withdrawn with prejudice in 2011.
- CCX moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment for CCX on May 25, 2012.
- Burkey filed stipulations dismissing Hanover (July 20, 2012) and West Point (July 26, 2013) with prejudice; a separate praecipe titled "Order to Settle Discontinue and End" was filed by Burkey on August 6, 2013.
- Burkey filed a notice of appeal as to CCX on September 3, 2013. CCX moved to quash, arguing the appeal was untimely because the July 26, 2013 stipulation rendered the summary judgment final.
- The Superior Court agreed with CCX and quashed the appeal as untimely (filed after the 30-day appeal period ran from July 26, 2013).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did the 30-day appeal period begin for the summary judgment in favor of CCX? | The appeal period began on Aug 6, 2013 when Burkey filed an "Order to Settle Discontinue and End" (a praecipe/form) finalizing dismissal. | The appeal period began on Jul 26, 2013 when Burkey filed the signed Stipulation to Dismiss as to the final defendant, West Point, rendering prior orders final. | Held: The period began Jul 26, 2013 with the Stipulation to Dismiss; Burkey’s Sept 3 notice was untimely and appeal is quashed. |
| Whether a stipulation consenting to dismissal of the remaining defendant required a court order or prothonotary notice to be effective for finality/appealability | Stipulation was not final without court order or prothonotary notice under Pa.R.C.P. 236. | Stipulation met Pa.R.C.P. 229 (written consent of all parties) and did not require a court order or prothonotary notice to render prior judgments final. | Held: The signed stipulation/discontinuance was effective under Rule 229; no separate court order or prothonotary notice was required to trigger finality. |
| Whether prior case law cited by Burkey (Toney, Chamberlin, Thierfelder) mandates court approval for stipulations to be effective | Burkey argued those cases support needing an order approving stipulation to trigger appealability. | CCX argued those cases are distinguishable/dicta and do not override Rule 229’s written-consent mechanism. | Held: The cases are distinguishable or inapposite; they do not alter Rule 229’s rule that written consent of all parties can effect a discontinuance. |
Key Cases Cited
- General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1970) (interlocutory dismissals generally not appealable until final disposition)
- Baker v. Cambridge Chase, Inc., 725 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. 1999) (piecemeal judgments among original multiple defendants become appealable when suit is resolved against the final defendant)
- Weible v. Allied Signal, Inc., 963 A.2d 521 (Pa. Super. 2008) (docket entry or settlement as to remaining parties can render prior orders final for appeal purposes)
- Gutteridge v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 804 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 2002) (trial court docket entry noting settlement can make prior grants of summary judgment final)
- Harahan v. AC & S, Inc., 816 A.2d 296 (Pa. Super. 2003) (same principle regarding finality after settlement/docket entry)
- Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 2008) (distinguishable dictum regarding stipulations and discontinuances)
- Chamberlin of Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Fort Pitt Chemical Co., 352 A.2d 176 (Pa. Super. 1975) (federal-stipulation context; does not establish Pennsylvania requirement of court order for discontinuance)
- Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 1251 (Pa. 2012) (inapposite observation that a stipulation in that case was court-approved)