Burcie, Troy Scott, PD-0723-15

Background

Troy Scott Burcie was arrested for felony DWI after a traffic stop; officers had probable cause and learned he had two prior DWI convictions.
Under Texas Transportation Code § 724.012(b)(3) (then in force), officers compelled a nonconsensual blood draw at the hospital after Burcie refused to provide a specimen.
The trial court denied Burcie’s pretrial motion to suppress the blood evidence; he pleaded guilty reserving that issue and appealed.
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the denial of suppression, relying on recent McNeely-related authority and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ Villarreal opinion.
The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review, arguing statutory implied-consent draws are reasonable, that multiple Fourth Amendment doctrines (including special-needs and balancing) support the statute, and that exclusionary remedies should not apply to conduct lawful at the time.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Burcie)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1. Does a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw under Tex. Trans. Code § 724.012(b) violate the Fourth Amendment?	Statute-authorized compelled draw violates Fourth Amendment after Missouri v. McNeely; warrant required absent exigency.	The statute codifies exigency, probable-cause, and gravity-of-offense limits making the seizure reasonable.	Court of Appeals: suppression required (reversed trial court). State seeks CCA review.
2. Are warrant-preference exceptions the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in warrantless seizures?	McNeely rejects per se rules; exigency and warrant availability are central.	Reasonableness can be assessed via multiple doctrines (special-needs, statutory codification, balancing); less-intrusive-alternatives should not foreclose other exceptions.	Court of Appeals followed Villarreal in rejecting cumulative/non-dualistic approach; State disputes that analysis.
3. Should exclusionary-rule principles mandate suppression of blood evidence drawn pursuant to a then-valid mandatory statute later questioned by McNeely?	If the seizure is unconstitutional, exclusion should follow.	Exclusion is inappropriate: officer acted under valid statute at the time; Texas article 38.23(a) requires a contemporaneous violation; federal good-faith doctrines support admission.	State argues exclusion not triggered because seizure complied with law at the time; appellate court avoided deciding exclusion in depth.
4. Does the special-needs doctrine or administrative ALR interest justify mandatory draws?	Not central to plaintiff; McNeely focuses on exigency and warrants.	The ALR/public-safety regulatory purpose supports application of special-needs analysis and reasonableness.	State urges CCA to adopt these considerations; lower courts divided.

Key Cases Cited

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (upholding involuntary blood draw under Fourth Amendment framework and recognizing implied-consent practices)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigency-based approval of blood draw where delay threatened destruction of evidence)
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (rejecting per se rule that natural metabolization of alcohol always creates exigency; exigency to be judged case-by-case)
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (applying special-needs doctrine to uphold suspicionless toxicological testing in safety-sensitive settings)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (recognizing a good-faith exception when officers reasonably rely on a statute later held invalid)
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (limiting exclusion when officers reasonably relied on binding precedent later overruled)
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (considering reasonableness of officer's mistaken understanding of law and discussing limits of exclusion)
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding the seriousness of the underlying offense is relevant in exigency/reasonableness analysis)