Buntin v. City of Boston, 857 F.3d 69

Plaintiff Jeannette Buntin sued on behalf of her late father Oswald Hixon, a Black former City of Boston DPW employee, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation leading to suspension, termination, and false testimony by supervisors.
Buntin initially pleaded claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983; this court previously affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims on statute-of-limitations grounds but reversed dismissal of § 1981 claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand the parties conducted discovery limited to § 1981 damages claims; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding § 1981 does not create a damages remedy against state actors and that § 1983 is the exclusive remedy.
The issue on appeal was whether Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. (which held § 1981 provides no damages remedy against state actors because § 1983 is the exclusive remedy) remains controlling after Congress amended § 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The First Circuit affirmed, holding Jett controls and Congress did not evidence an intent in the 1991 amendments to create an independent § 1981 damages remedy against state actors; the court also held Buntin failed to plead individual-capacity claims against the supervisors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1981 (as amended in 1991) implies a private right of action for damages against state actors	§ 1981(c) and (b) (1991) show Congress intended to protect against state-action impairments and thus revived/created a § 1981 damages remedy against state actors	Jett controls: Congress did not expressly create a damages remedy; § 1983 remains the exclusive federal remedy for § 1981 violations by state actors	Jett remains controlling; § 1981 does not provide an implied damages action against state actors; affirm dismissal
Whether Buntin I created law of the case that § 1981 provides a damages remedy against state actors	Earlier panel said allegations plausibly stated a § 1981 claim, which implicitly recognized a § 1981 damages remedy	Buntin I did not address the remedy question; law-of-the-case does not apply to an issue not decided earlier	No law-of-the-case bar; the remedy question was open and properly considered on remand
Whether supervisors Alther and McGonagle are proper defendants in individual capacity on § 1981 damages theory	Buntin sued them in both official and individual capacities	Defendants: allegations only concern official supervisory actions; no allegations they acted outside scope of official capacity	Claims against supervisors in individual capacity insufficiently alleged; only official-capacity theory was pleaded

Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (§ 1983 is the exclusive federal damages remedy for § 1981 violations by state actors)
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (pre-Jett decision addressed post-contract discrimination under § 1981)
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (§ 1981 reaches private and governmental discrimination)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom for constitutional violations)
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (private rights of action must be created by Congress; statutory intent is central)
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (clarifies standards for inferring private rights of action)
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (limits Cort v. Ash factors; statutory intent is central)