51 Cal.App.5th 134
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- Petitioner Dyjuan Bullock was charged March 3, 2020; arraigned March 4, pleaded not guilty, and did not waive the 10-court-day right under Penal Code §859b. Preliminary hearing set for March 16.
- On March 13 the Contra Costa Superior Court announced closure of courthouses March 16–April 1 and (mistakenly) treated those days as "holidays" for computing timelines; the Chief Justice issued an order that extended §859b from 10 to 15 court days only for deadlines expiring Mar 16–Apr 1.
- The preliminary hearing did not occur by the 10- or 15-court-day deadlines. Petitioner moved to dismiss under §859b on March 30.
- The Chief Justice later issued a statewide March 30 order authorizing extension to 30 court days; the Superior Court held Bullock’s preliminary hearing April 9 and denied his §859b dismissal request, finding pandemic conditions constituted good cause to continue.
- This Court held (1) a writ under Gov. Code §871.6 was the proper vehicle to challenge an §859b continuance, (2) the Superior Court abused its discretion because it made no particularized showing linking COVID-19 conditions to an inability to hold Bullock’s preliminary hearing by the statutory deadline, and (3) although dismissal would have been required, Bullock’s petition here was dismissed as moot after he pled to a charge pursuant to a negotiated disposition.
Issues
| Issue | Bullock (plaintiff) | People / Superior Court (defendant) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper procedural vehicle to review alleged §859b violation | Writ under §871.6 in superior court (and then appellate review) is proper | §995 motion to set aside information is appropriate | §871.6 writ procedure is proper for reviewing §859b continuance decisions |
| Whether dismissal remedy may still be imposed if preliminary hearing later occurred | Dismissal under §859b remains available even after hearing | Dismissal unnecessary if hearing later held | Dismissal sanction can still apply after a preliminary hearing (Ramos principle affirmed) |
| Whether pandemic conditions alone show good cause to continue preliminary hearing past the extended period | No — must show particularized nexus between pandemic conditions and inability to hold that specific hearing | Yes — pandemic and related court closures/health risks justified continuance | Court abused discretion: general pandemic statements without a specific nexus are insufficient to show good cause |
| Whether Superior Court could treat closure days as holidays or rely on Chief Justice orders to excuse delay | Court erred in treating closure days as holidays for §859b and misapplied orders | Court relied on Chief Justice orders and emergency conditions to justify delay | Superior Court misapplied the March orders (§859b was not deemed a holiday), and its later good-cause finding lacked particularized support |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Ramos, 146 Cal.App.4th 719 (Ct. App. 2006) (dismissal sanction under §859b may apply even after a later preliminary hearing)
- People v. Tucker, 196 Cal.App.4th 1313 (Ct. App. 2011) (quarantine of incarcerated defendant can create particularized good cause to delay trial)
- In re Venable, 86 Cal.App. 585 (Ct. App. 1927) (epidemic may constitute good cause to continue trial where juries cannot be convened)
- Correa v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 444 (Cal. 2002) (function and scope of preliminary examination)
- People v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (Cal. 2016) (§859b timing and good-cause principles)
- Landrum v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.3d 1 (Cal. 1981) (legislative policy behind §859b’s prompt preliminary hearing for incarcerated defendants)
- People v. Standish, 38 Cal.4th 858 (Cal. 2006) (mandatory nature of §859b time limits)
- People v. Engram, 50 Cal.4th 1131 (Cal. 2010) (lack of judge or courtroom attributable to the state is not good cause to delay criminal proceedings)