Bullcoming v. New Mexico
131 S. Ct. 2705
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Bullcoming was charged with aggravated DWI based on a blood-alcohol analysis conducted by the New Mexico SLD.
- SLD’s “Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis” certified Bullcoming’s BAC at 0.21 g/dl, and listed testing/handling procedures.
- The certifying analyst Curtis Caylor was placed on unpaid leave; the State presented Razatos, a different analyst, to testify about procedures but Razatos did not participate in testing Bullcoming’s sample.
- The New Mexico Supreme Court admitted the blood-alcohol report as a business record and allowed Razatos to testify to the machine and procedures as a surrogate for Caylor.
- The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause requires the analyst who made the certification to testify, and surrogate testimony is insufficient, so the New Mexico court’s judgment reversing and admitting via surrogate testimony was incorrect.
- The Court reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether surrogate testimony suffices for a testimonial report | Bullcoming — surrogate witness cannot substitute for the certifying analyst | State — surrogate testimony adequately conveyed testing and procedures | No; surrogate testimony does not satisfy Confrontation Clause |
| Whether the BAC report is testimonial | Report is testimonial under Melendez-Diaz/Crawford | Report is non-testimonial or admissible as a business/public record | Testimonial; Confrontation Clause applies |
| Whether New Mexico could admit the report as evidence via Razatos’ testimony | Admission via Razatos bypasses the defendant’s right to confront the certifying analyst | Procedural safeguards and machine-tested data justify surrogate testimony | Not permissible; analyst must testify |
| Whether the Court should address burdens on prosecution or retain states’ evidentiary schemes | Rigid application of Confrontation Clause would unduly burden prosecutions | States should retain ability to use forensic reports with appropriate safeguards | Court questions burden but rejects loosening Confrontation Clause protections |
| Whether this case should be remanded for harmless-error review | Unconfronted testimony harmed Bullcoming’s defense | Possible harmless error given overall trial fairness | Remand for harmless-error analysis if applicable |
Key Cases Cited
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (forensic certificates are testimonial; must confront analyst)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (established confrontation principle: unavailability and cross-examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (U.S. 2006) (hearsay/Confrontation interplay; not all statements protected)
- Bryant v. Michigan, 562 U.S. 344 (U.S. 2011) (primary purpose test for testimonial status; hearsay relevance)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (U.S. 2008) (Confrontation/constitutional limits; state interests)
- Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (U.S. 2011) (reiterates unavailability and cross-examination framework)
- United States v. Gonzalez-López, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. 2006) (right to counsel context cited for substitute safeguards)