Budik v. Ashley
36 F. Supp. 3d 132
D.D.C.2014Background
- Budik, proceeding pro se, sues Lt. Col. Ashley for defamation, fraud, Privacy Act violations, and 10 U.S.C. § 1102 violations; case was removed from New York state court to SDNY and then transferred to this court.
- Ashley was Budik's supervisor at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (Nov 2007–Feb 2008) and added comments to a DA Form 5374 about her interaction with staff.
- Dartmouth and Sterling Medical disclosures included the same adverse statement written by Ashley, linked to Budik’s professional evaluations.
- A June 2008 phone call between Budik and Col. Princiotta related to the Dartmouth evaluation preceded the Dartmouth rating being completed and later signed.
- The court substitutes the United States under the Westfall Act/FTCA after certification that Ashley acted within the scope of employment; Budik failed to rebut the certification.
- Even if not foreclosed by the FTCA, Budik’s tort claims are barred by lack of administrative exhaustion, and her Privacy Act and 10 U.S.C. § 1102 claims are rejected on res judicata/issue preclusion grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the United States should be substituted under the Westfall Act | Budik argues substitution should not occur, challenging scope-of-employment. | Ashley acted within the scope of employment; substitution appropriate. | Yes; United States substituted as defendant. |
| Whether FTCA bars Budik's tort claims (misrepresentation, fraud, defamation) | Claims arise from false statements by Ashley awaiting relief under FTCA. | FTCA bars libel/slander/misrepresentation claims; jurisdiction lacking. | Held barred under FTCA; claims dismissed. |
| Whether Budik exhausted administrative remedies under FTCA | Administrative claim filed or underlying process attempted; exhaustion satisfied. | No proper FTCA administrative claim filed; exhaustion not satisfied. | Yes; lack of administrative exhaustion deprives court of jurisdiction. |
| Whether Budik's Privacy Act claim is barred by issue preclusion | Disclosures violated the Privacy Act as in prior action. | Issues already decided in Budik II; precluded. | Yes; issue preclusion bars Privacy Act claim. |
| Whether Budik's 10 U.S.C. § 1102 claim is barred by res judicata/issue preclusion | Disclosures violated § 1102; remedy sought here. | Prior ruling in Budik II resolves the issue; no new relief available. | Yes; precluded by issue preclusion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Budik v. United States (Budik II), 949 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (FTCA/exhaustion and Privacy Act issues; preclusion effects discussed)
- Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (certification under FTCA constitutes prima facie evidence of scope)
- Martin v. DOJ, 488 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (issue preclusion standards; preclusion for prior determinations)
- Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (purpose and scope of preclusion in civil litigation)