Buckles v. EUBA Corp., 3:18-cv-00355

Plaintiff Mary Buckles sued EUBA Corp. and individual owners under the FLSA and Ohio wage laws, seeking to represent current and former delivery drivers.
Buckles signed an arbitration agreement that bars her from suing and from acting in a representative capacity; she conceded her individual claims are subject to arbitration.
An opt-in plaintiff, Michael Hunter McConnell (through his daughter Kacey), filed a consent to join the FLSA collective; there is no evidence he signed an arbitration agreement.
Defendants moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay the class/collective action; they argued Buckles’ arbitration agreement required dismissal of the entire suit.
McConnell moved for leave to file a first amended complaint substituting her father as the named plaintiff and class representative; defendants opposed, arguing the case was rendered non-justiciable by Buckles’ concession.
The court ordered Buckles to arbitrate her individual claims and stayed them, denied dismissal of the entire case, and granted leave to substitute McConnell as the named plaintiff and class representative.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Buckles’ claims are arbitrable	Buckles concedes she must arbitrate individually	Arbitration agreement requires Buckles to arbitrate and precludes representative suits	Buckles must arbitrate individual claims; those claims are stayed
Whether the entire class/collective action must be dismissed	Case is not moot because an opt-in plaintiff exists to pursue collective/class claims	Buckles’ arbitration concession renders the case non-justiciable and dismissal is appropriate	Court refused to dismiss entire case; stayed only Buckles’ individual claims
Whether an opt-in plaintiff may be substituted as named plaintiff/class representative	McConnell (opt-in) may be substituted and seeks leave to amend	Defendants contend amendment is improper and an independent suit should be filed	Leave to amend granted; McConnell substituted as named plaintiff and class representative
Whether the case is moot after the named plaintiff’s arbitration concession	Not moot because opt-in plaintiffs are parties under FLSA and preserve justiciability	Moot because named plaintiff no longer has a personal stake	Not moot; presence of opt-in plaintiffs preserves justiciability

Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (2013) (Supreme Court mootness analysis in FLSA context; noted different result if opt-in plaintiffs exist)
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (court referenced in relation to mootness/offer-of-judgment issues)
O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (opt-in employees in an FLSA collective become parties distinct from Rule 23 class members)