340 P.3d 546
Mont.2014Background
- Steven and Susan Buck married in 1988 and lived mostly abroad; they owned a house in Montana where the family vacationed.
- Susan moved to Florida in June 2010 and filed for dissolution in Florida in October 2010; that court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Steven.
- Susan filed a dissolution petition in Montana on January 8, 2013, alleging she "temporarily resides in Florida" and "has been a resident of the State of Montana for in excess of 90 days."
- Steven moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing neither spouse had been domiciled in Montana for the 90 days before Susan’s initial petition.
- Susan later filed a supplemental petition (with leave) alleging she currently resided in Montana and had been domiciled in Montana for over 90 days; Steven admitted those allegations in his response.
- The District Court denied Steven’s motion to dismiss; Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding a supplemental pleading alleging the 90‑day domicile cured any jurisdictional defect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because neither party was domiciled in Montana for 90 days before the initial petition | Susan: Any jurisdictional defect was cured when she established 90‑day domicile and alleged it in a supplemental pleading | Steven: Jurisdiction was lacking at the time the action commenced; supplemental pleading cannot cure that defect | Court: Held supplemental pleading alleging domicile for 90 days cured any jurisdictional defect; affirmed denial of dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (U.S. 1976) (supplemental pleadings may cure subject‑matter jurisdiction defects)
- Feldman v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (supplemental pleading can cure many pleading defects; favors adjudication on merits)
- Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (statutory prerequisites may bar curing jurisdictional defects by supplementation if permitting cure would defeat statutory purpose)
- Black v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 93 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (supplementation can cure jurisdictional defects where consistent with statutory goals)
- Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (jurisdictional defect cured by supplemental filing after satisfying statutory prerequisite)
- M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990) (copyright registration after filing can be alleged by supplemental pleading to cure jurisdictional defect)
- Schuster v. Northwestern Energy Co., 314 P.3d 650 (Mont. 2013) (standard of review for jurisdictional determinations)
