Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52

Background

Plaintiffs are car-accident patients who received hospital care, had hospital liens on their personal-injury recoveries, and settled with contingent-fee attorneys.
In each case, plaintiffs paid attorney fees from the settlement, then paid the asserted hospital liens in full and retained any remainder.
Plaintiffs sought reimbursement from hospitals for a proportional share of the attorney fees and costs, arguing the Hospital Lien Statute requires hospitals to bear their fair share when a lien is paid from settlement proceeds generated by the patient’s attorney.
Hospitals argued the statute establishes a priority order for distribution of settlement proceeds and contains no proportional-fee-sharing requirement.
The district court granted summary judgment to the hospitals; the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, interpreting Utah Code § 38-7-1(1) as creating a priority: attorney fees are paid first from the judgment, then the hospital lien may be asserted against the net amount, and no other reduction is allowed except as agreed in writing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Utah’s Hospital Lien Statute require hospitals to pay a proportional share of plaintiffs’ attorney fees when a hospital lien is paid from settlement proceeds?	Statute requires hospitals to reimburse a proportional share of attorney fees/costs when a lien is paid due to plaintiff’s attorney efforts.	Statute contains no proportional-sharing language; it creates a priority system allowing hospitals to be paid from net settlement proceeds.	Court held no proportional-share obligation; statute creates priority: attorney fees paid first, hospital lien attaches to remainder, no other reductions allowed absent written agreement.
Is the statute ambiguous as to fee allocation?	Ambiguity supports reading that requires proportional sharing.	Statute read as a whole yields a single plausible meaning; not ambiguous.	Court found statute unambiguous when read in context and grammatical structure; no need to look beyond plain text.
May the court import proportional-sharing via canons or policy (substantive-terms canon)?	Courts should adopt proportional sharing as other jurisdictions have.	Court must not add substantive terms not in statute.	Court refused to add substantive fee-sharing terms; substantive-terms canon bars importing omitted obligations.
Can plaintiffs invoke the common-fund doctrine to shift attorney fees to hospitals?	Common-fund doctrine prevents unjust enrichment and should require hospitals to contribute.	Common-fund doctrine does not apply to creditor liens on a debtor’s judgment; statute/law do not incorporate it.	Court held common-fund doctrine inapplicable where hospitals are creditors with enforceable liens; doctrine does not override statutory scheme.

Key Cases Cited

Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 227 P.3d 256 (Utah 2010) (standard of review for statutory interpretation and summary judgment)
Anderson v. Bell, 234 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2010) (plain-language rule as primary evidence of legislative intent)
Garrard v. Gateway Fin. Servs., Inc., 207 P.3d 1227 (Utah 2009) (statute construed according to plain language)
State v. Barrett, 127 P.3d 682 (Utah 2005) (read statute as a whole and harmonize provisions)
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 267 P.3d 863 (Utah 2011) (ambiguity exists only if multiple reasonable interpretations remain after whole-text analysis)
Utah Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. State, 131 P.3d 208 (Utah 2006) (statute may be unambiguous when context renders alternative meanings implausible)
State v. Rushton, 395 P.3d 92 (Utah 2017) (context can resolve apparent ambiguity)
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 38 P.3d 291 (Utah 2001) (substantive-terms canon — presume legislature used each word advisedly)
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 24 P.3d 928 (Utah 2001) (courts will not infer substantive terms not in statute)
Barker v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998) (describing the common-fund doctrine and its purpose)