Bryce Patrick v. City of Elizabeth
159 A.3d 906
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2017Background
- Eight-year-old Bryce Patrick was struck while crossing a street near Brophy Field (a municipal park) about a block from a public elementary school; a passing vehicle struck him after another motorist had stopped to let children cross. A "Watch for Children" sign existed on the street.
- Plaintiff sued the City of Elizabeth and the Elizabeth Board of Education (BOE), alleging the roadway was a dangerous condition and signage was inadequate (including lack of school-zone signage). Claims against the driver were resolved earlier.
- Discovery was extended multiple times; the trial court denied a fourth extension and barred plaintiff’s liability expert report as untimely, finding no exceptional circumstances under Rule 4:24-1.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment based on immunities in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), including discretionary-function immunity and the specific exemption for ordinary traffic signs.
- The trial judge granted summary judgment, finding plaintiff failed to prove a dangerous condition or notice, that signage decisions are discretionary and immunized (N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 and 59:2-3), and that the BOE did not own/control the roadway.
- Plaintiff appealed, arguing (1) the court erred in finding no dangerous condition and (2) the liability expert should not have been barred; the Appellate Division affirmed on both grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether roadway/signage constituted a "dangerous condition" under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 | Lint: lack of school-zone/speed signage, faded crosswalks, and nearby traffic increase created a dangerous condition and put defendants on notice | City: no proof of dangerous condition or notice; BOE: did not own/control road; signage decisions discretionary/immunized | Court: No actionable dangerous condition proven; no notice; BOE not liable for nonowned property |
| Whether failure to provide school-zone signage is excepted from TCA immunity (N.J.S.A. 59:4-5) | Lint: school zones require higher standard; school-zone signs are not merely "ordinary" signs, so immunity should not apply | Defs: 59:4-5 bars liability for ordinary traffic signs; placement of signs is discretionary under statute and municipal authority | Court: Signs here are "ordinary" for 59:4-5; installation/placement is discretionary and immunized; no special school-zone exception in TCA |
| Whether BOE had duty to ensure public road safety adjacent to school/park | Lint: BOE knew park would be used and had proximate responsibility to keep area safe | BOE: did not own, control, or maintain roadway; cannot be liable under property-based TCA provisions | Court: BOE did not own/control the road; TCA requires ownership/control for property-liability; BOE not liable |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying further discovery and barring expert report | Lint: sought 60-day extension and depositions; counsel's injury created exceptional circumstances | Defs: plaintiff already had multiple extensions; no diligence shown; expert report deadline missed before counsel's injury | Court: Denial was not an abuse of discretion; plaintiff failed to show exceptional circumstances; barring expert proper and unlikely to change immunity analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowe v. Mazel Thirty, LLC, 209 N.J. 35 (review standard for summary judgment)
- Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51 (public-entity liability limited under TCA)
- Kahrar v. Borough of Wallington, 171 N.J. 3 (public-entity immunity absent statute imposing liability)
- Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376 (precedence of specific immunity provisions)
- Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 142 N.J. 520 (standard for summary judgment conflicts)
- Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386 ("palpably unreasonable" standard for imposing liability)
- Macaluso v. Knowles, 341 N.J. Super. 112 (rejecting a special-relationship exception to TCA immunities)
- Aebi v. Monmouth County Highway Dep't, 148 N.J. Super. 430 (N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 consistent with discretionary-function immunity)
