92-1638
3rd Cir.Nov 16, 2022Background:
- In 1995 Bryan Range pleaded guilty to welfare fraud under 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 481(a); at the time the offense carried up to five years’ imprisonment and therefore qualified as a federal "felony-equivalent" under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).
- Range attempted to buy firearms after his conviction and was denied twice by the federal background-check system; he later sold a rifle when he learned he was prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Range brought an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the district court granted the Government summary judgment applying the pre-Bruen Binderup framework.
- The Supreme Court decided Bruen while the appeal was pending, displacing the two-step means-end approach and requiring courts to assess firearm regulations against the text and the Nation’s historical tradition.
- The Third Circuit conducted the Bruen-style historical analysis on the record, concluded that the Second Amendment protects "law‑abiding, responsible citizens," and held that felons and felony-equivalents (including nonviolent offenses like Range’s) fall outside "the people." The court affirmed the district court judgment.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) as applied to Range violates the Second Amendment under Bruen | Range: History supports disarming only those with a dangerous propensity; he is peaceful and not dangerous | Gov: History shows legislatures long disarmed persons who demonstrated disrespect for law, including nonviolent felons; government bears burden to show historical analogue | Held: § 922(g)(1) constitutional as applied; Range (a felony-equivalent) is outside "the people" and gov't met its historical-burden |
| Who bears the burden under Bruen to justify firearm restrictions | Range: Government must prove exclusion but has not done so for his peaceful status | Gov: Government bears burden and can rely on historical analogues; it has done so here | Held: Bruen places burden on government; government satisfied it on this record |
| Continued viability of Binderup two-step test after Bruen | Range: Binderup’s multifactor ‘‘seriousness’’ inquiry is displaced | Gov: Bruen replaces means-end inquiry with historical analogue test but case can be decided on existing record | Held: Bruen abrogated Binderup’s means-end step; court applied Bruen’s text-and-history test without remand and resolved appeal |
| Whether nonviolent, non-dangerous offenses can justify disarmament | Range: Historical tradition disarmed only dangerous persons, not peaceful offenders | Gov: Historical record contains status-based and nonviolent disarmaments (oaths, loyalty statutes, nonviolent felonies, hunting forfeitures) | Held: Court rejected narrow dangerousness-only rule; nonviolent felonies/felon-equivalents may be disqualifying |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to keep and bear arms; called felon-disarmament presumptively lawful)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (abrogated means-end scrutiny; requires text-and-history analysis and places burden on government to identify historical analogues)
- Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (pre-Bruen two-step Second Amendment framework adopted by Third Circuit)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (Third Circuit’s en banc application of the two-step test and civic-virtue analysis for § 922(g)(1) challenges)
- Folajtar v. Attorney General, 980 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 2020) (third‑circuit discussion of civic‑virtue limits and dissenting views on dangerousness requirement)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment against the states; reiterated Heller’s view that certain longstanding restrictions are presumptively lawful)