Bruno v. Woodall (Hillsborough County), 8:19-cv-00172

Background

On August 1, 2000, Robert Glenn Bruno shot and killed a driver after a high-speed ‘‘road rage’’ chase; Bruno claimed his friend Robert Nash was the shooter. A .45 shell casing was recovered at the scene.
Investigators later searched Bruno’s storage unit pursuant to a warrant based on informant tips and a jail call; agents recovered a box of .45 ammunition matching the shell casing’s make.
Bruno was tried for second-degree murder, testified in his own defense, was convicted by a jury, and sentenced to life.
Bruno pursued state postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850; the trial/postconviction courts denied relief and Florida appellate courts affirmed without opinion.
Bruno filed a federal habeas petition raising multiple ineffective-assistance claims (failure to suppress the ammunition, failures in witness impeachment/preservation of evidence, failure to prevent or prepare him for testimony, failure to exclude a prior road-rage incident, prosecutorial/judicial-bias objections, and related claims); the federal district court denied habeas relief under AEDPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure to suppress ammunition (Ground 1)	Warrant affidavit contained stale, unverified, double‑hearsay statements and misstatements; counsel should have more vigorously attacked affidavit and impeached the affiant.	Warrant affidavit (informants + jail call) independently supplied probable cause; counsel did challenge staleness/veracity at hearing; hearsay objections would be meritless.	Denied — state court reasonably found counsel not deficient and any errors immaterial to probable cause.
Allowing Bruno to testify / lack of preparation (Ground 2)	Bruno was sleep‑deprived and unprepared; counsel should have prevented him from testifying or asked for continuance/curative instruction.	Defendant has a constitutional right to testify; Bruno’s testimony was coherent and was reasonable trial strategy to present his only direct exculpatory evidence.	Denied — counsel was not ineffective; Bruno’s testimony was competent and not shown to prejudice outcome.
Admission of prior road‑rage incident (Ground 3)	Counsel failed to exclude prior road‑rage episode two hours earlier and failed to preserve objection for appeal.	Counsel moved in limine and argued remoteness and Williams/inextricably‑intertwined grounds; court admitted evidence; re‑arguing at trial would not have changed result.	Denied — counsel reasonably litigated the issue; failure to prevail is not ineffective assistance.
Failure to impeach witnesses about bias/ prior bad acts (Grounds 4–5)	Counsel should have explored Nash’s alleged motorcycle theft/threats and Baker’s disputes to show motive to fabricate.	Trial record showed Nash and Bruno socialized frequently and counsel pursued other impeachment theories (alleged drug/escort motive); proposed impeachment unlikely to change verdict.	Denied — no reasonable probability of a different outcome; counsel pursued reasonable strategies.
Failure to preserve vehicles / obtain forensic testing (Ground 6)	Counsel failed to preserve cars for GSR and paint‑transfer testing that would have implicated Nash as shooter or shown a rear‑end collision explanation.	Claims are speculative; no expert proffer or proof that testing would have produced favorable results.	Denied — speculative allegations fail Strickland prejudice requirement.
Failure to retain ammunition‑date expert (Ground 7)	Expert could have shown retail sticker dated ammunition as >10 years old, undermining linkage to shooting.	Trial elicited evidence that box appeared old and that age alone does not make ammunition unusable; additional testimony would be cumulative.	Denied — no prejudice; evidence would be cumulative and not outcome‑determinative.
Failure to impeach/search‑officer (Ground 8)	Counsel should have introduced Bruno’s shoes and a 9mm seized at arrest to impeach Detective Tindall and challenge footprint/weapon evidence.	Shoes/9mm were not materially exculpatory (9mm was not the murder weapon); footprint speculation unsupported; counsel did impeach on relevant points.	Denied — no reasonable probability of different verdict; speculative or cumulative.
Judicial bias / failure to move for mistrial (Ground 9)	Judge’s out‑of‑jury comments revealed partiality; counsel should have objected and sought mistrial.	Remarks were rulings on relevance and admissibility, not judicial bias; under Florida law no mistrial basis existed.	Denied — state court correctly found no basis for mistrial; counsel not ineffective for not raising meritless objections.
Prosecutorial misconduct objections (Ground 11)	Counsel failed to object/move for mistrial to several alleged improper prosecutorial statements and actions.	Most remarks were fair inferences, clarifying questions, or were addressed by objections/sustentions; no prejudice shown.	Denied — comments were not improper or not prejudicial; counsel’s objections were adequate where warranted.
Other evidentiary/timeline/jury‑contact claims & cumulative error	Various failures (timeline, failure to question Nash about threats, hearsay exclusions, alleged jury contact) collectively deprived Bruno of a fair trial.	Many issues were meritless, speculative, or rejected on credibility; no single claim shows prejudice, so cumulative claim fails.	Denied — individual claims lack merit; no aggregate prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards explained)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (double‑deference where Strickland and AEDPA overlap)
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (AEDPA’s aim to prevent federal retrials and to defer to state‑court convictions)
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (probable cause may be founded on hearsay; framework for challenging warrant affidavits)
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual‑innocence gateway standard for defaulted claims)
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018) (look‑through doctrine for unexplained state‑court affirmances)
United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (affidavits for search warrants may be based on hearsay)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (federal court must ask whether state court’s Strickland determination was unreasonable)