Brumfield v. Louisiana State Board of Education
806 F.3d 289
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- Brumfield (filed 1971) challenged Louisiana’s state aid to racially discriminatory private schools; a 1975 injunction banned such aid and established a Brumfield certification process; the court retained continuing jurisdiction for that remedial purpose.
- A 1985 consent decree refined the private-school certification regime and required reporting to DOJ while the decree remained in effect.
- In 2012 Louisiana enacted a student scholarship (voucher) program that awards scholarships to low-income students (money follows the child) to attend public or Brumfield-certified private schools; the program served thousands, predominantly African-American students.
- DOJ sought information and then moved (2013) in the Brumfield case for "further relief"—originally seeking an injunction preventing voucher awards to students in districts under separate desegregation orders and later seeking an annual, ongoing review process of voucher awards.
- The district court (April 8, 2014) imposed an annual, indefinite reporting/ pre-award review regime requiring Louisiana to provide detailed applicant data to DOJ and allowed DOJ wide use of the data in other desegregation cases; intervenors (parents and advocacy group) denied participation earlier, later moved to vacate under Rules 59(e), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5).
- The Fifth Circuit reversed: it held the April 2014 order is an injunction beyond the scope of the Brumfield court’s continuing jurisdiction and therefore void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 60(b)(4)); the injunction was dissolved and the motion for further relief dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction under Brumfield to regulate Louisiana’s voucher program | DOJ: Brumfield/consent-decree jurisdiction encompasses preventing state actions (including vouchers) that may impede desegregation in public-school cases; court may modify decree to add oversight | Louisiana/Intervenors: Brumfield remedial scope was only to stop aid to racially discriminatory private schools; voucher program aids students, not segregated schools, and private schools in program are Brumfield-certified | Held: No subject-matter jurisdiction — the voucher oversight exceeded the original remedial scope and is unrelated to the constitutional infirmity; order void under Rule 60(b)(4) |
| Whether the April 2014 order was an appealable injunction rather than mere discovery | DOJ: Characterized the relief as discovery/pretrial information sharing | Intervenors: The order imposed permanent, costly, pre-award review and broad data-sharing — substantively an injunction/modification | Held: The April Order is an injunction (not mere discovery); denial of vacatur was appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) |
| Whether Rule 60(b)(4) relief is available for the claimed defect | DOJ: Contested appealability and scope; argued not a jurisdictional defect | Intervenors: The order is void because it exceeds the court’s continuing jurisdiction and thus is subject to Rule 60(b)(4) | Held: Rule 60(b)(4) applies — the judgment is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; vacatur required |
| Whether even an injunction exceeding equitable power must be attacked under Rule 60(b)(4) | DOJ/concurring view: errors in remedial scope can be non-jurisdictional and corrected on appeal or under other rules | Majority: Equitable overreach here was jurisdictional because relief was unrelated to original constitutional violation; therefore void | Held: Majority treats the overreach as a jurisdictional defect warranting vacatur; dissent disagreed, arguing Rule 60(b)(4) is cabined to subject-matter/personal-jurisdiction or due-process defects |
Key Cases Cited
- Brumfield v. Dodd, 405 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. La. 1976) (original injunction prohibiting state aid to racially discriminatory private schools and creating certification process)
- Brumfield v. Dodd (Brumfield I), 749 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2014) (intervention granted; DOJ’s relief characterized as potentially altering voucher awards)
- United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010) (Rule 60(b)(4) relief is narrow; voidness arises from fundamental infirmity)
- United States v. Texas, 158 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1998) (federal remedial desegregation jurisdiction limited to correction of the constitutional infirmity)
- Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial of Rule 60(b) motion can amount to refusal to dissolve an injunction and be appealable)
- Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (aid ‘‘following the child’’—assisting a student does not necessarily equate to impermissible aid to private schools)
- Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 728 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1984) (judgment void only if court lacked jurisdiction of subject matter or parties or acted inconsistent with due process)