83 F.4th 87
1st Cir.2023Background
- The Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Steamship Authority adopted a COVID-19 vaccine policy (modeled on a Massachusetts executive order) requiring employees to be fully vaccinated by Feb. 16, 2022, while permitting medical and religious exemptions subject to reasonable accommodation.
- Eleven current/former employees sought religious exemptions; nine were denied via form letters citing a "direct threat" to coworkers/customers; two were treated as untimely and suspended; several plaintiffs later vaccinated or were terminated.
- A non-party employee, Greg Manchester, received a time-limited medical exemption allowing him to work with masking and testing after recent infection, which plaintiffs contend shows unequal treatment of medical vs religious exemptions.
- Plaintiffs sued in state court (removed to federal court) under § 1983 (Free Exercise), the Fourteenth Amendment (privacy/personal autonomy), Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (Art. 2), and M.G.L. c.151B (religious discrimination), and moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining terminations/reinstating employment.
- The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief; the First Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded — holding the district court erred in concluding plaintiffs lacked a likelihood of success on their Free Exercise claim given the record about unequal exemption administration, but affirmed denials on the Fourteenth Amendment and state-law claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Free Exercise: Is the Policy "generally applicable" or subject to strict scrutiny because medical exemptions were granted but religious ones denied? | Policy as administered treats medical exemptions more favorably than religious ones (Manchester), so it is not generally applicable and must survive strict scrutiny. | Policy is neutral/general; medical exemptions differ legally/empirically from religious ones (and Title VII/ADA distinctions permit different treatment), so strict scrutiny does not apply. | Vacated district court's likelihood-of-success ruling and remanded for further fact-specific analysis on general applicability and scrutiny (may implicate Mills/Lowe analysis). |
| Fourteenth Amendment (privacy/autonomy): Does the Policy violate fundamental liberty interests? | Plaintiffs urge strict scrutiny given intrusion into autonomy and allege unconstitutional implementation. | Deference under Jacobson; rational-basis (or public-health) justification — stemming COVID-19 is a compelling/legitimate interest and the policy is plausibly related. | Affirmed: district court did not err; rational-basis/public-health justification sufficed for preliminary-injunction denial. |
| M.G.L. c.151B (religious discrimination): Did Authority unlawfully deny religious accommodations? | Plaintiffs assert religious discrimination and sincerity of beliefs; unequal treatment compared to medical exemption. | Authority showed accommodation would impose undue hardship (de minimis/operational burden); district court found plaintiffs failed to rebut. | Affirmed: plaintiffs failed to meaningfully contest the district court's undue-hardship conclusion; challenge waived. |
| Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (Art. 2): Does the Policy trench on religious ritual/worship? | Plaintiffs claim Policy burdens religious practice. | Authority: policy does not target religious ritual; it regulates workplace safety. | Affirmed: plaintiffs did not meaningfully dispute district court reasoning that no ritual was implicated; claim waived. |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standards for preliminary injunction)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (neutrality and general applicability in Free Exercise analysis)
- Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (government must be neutral and generally applicable; individualized exemptions can trigger strict scrutiny)
- Emp. Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (framework for neutral laws of general applicability)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (deference to public-health measures)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (public-health interests can be compelling; context for COVID restrictions)
- Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021) (comparability test for religious vs secular activities)
- Does 1-6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20 (1st Cir. 2021) (upholding denial of injunction where record did not show medical exemption undermined mandate)
- Lowe v. Mills, 68 F.4th 706 (1st Cir. 2023) (plausible that medical exemptions can undermine mandate; complaint survived dismissal)
- Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states/arms of state not "persons" under § 1983)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (limits on federal courts supervising state-law compliance)
- Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023) (context on reasonable accommodation/undue hardship)
- A.C. by Waithe v. McKee, 23 F.4th 37 (1st Cir. 2022) (rational-basis review suffices where government has plausible public-health justification)
- Zannino v. Barry, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990) (issues not developed on appeal are deemed waived)
- We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266 (2d Cir. 2021) (use of aggregate data and comparability in exemption analysis)