79 A.3d 410
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2013Background
- Home invasion (Aug 18, 2009): two masked men (one with a gun) assaulted Royce and Linda Miller, took cash, a cell phone, and Mrs. Miller’s wedding ring; gloves later found near neighbor Harley’s property.
- Glove DNA uploaded to CODIS produced a match to Browne after a buccal swab taken while he was arrested on unrelated violent-offense charges; a Charles County warrant produced a second confirmatory buccal swab.
- Browne was indicted on multiple counts (robbery with a dangerous weapon, handgun use, first-degree burglary, false imprisonment, conspiracy, felon-in-possession) and convicted by jury; aggregate executed sentence 40 years.
- Trial events: jury twice reported being deadlocked; after the first note an individual juror (Juror No. 281) approached the bench and identified himself as the lone holdout; the court privately admonished him to listen to fellow jurors; later the jury sent a second note again identifying Juror 281 as the holdout; the court sent jurors home and they returned the following morning and reached a verdict.
- Post-trial motions: Browne moved to suppress DNA and his oral statements; moved for mistrial based on alleged coercion of the jury. The trial court denied suppression motions and the mistrial motion; the Court of Special Appeals reversed on the mistrial issue, affirmed denials of suppression motions, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Browne) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denying mistrial after two deadlock reports (one revealing a self-identified lone holdout and private bench admonition) coerced the verdict | Trial court’s private instruction to the self-identified holdout and then sending jurors home after a 2nd note naming him was coercive; mistrial required | Court permissibly managed deliberations; denying mistrial and sending jurors back next day was within discretion | Reversed: denying mistrial was an abuse of discretion; individual bench admonition and subsequent inaction created high coercive potential and required mistrial |
| Whether DNA evidence (buccal swab from arrest) should be suppressed under King v. State | Swab taken while under arrest for violent offense violated Fourth Amendment per King v. State (Md. Ct. of Appeals) | After U.S. Supreme Court in Maryland v. King, collecting DNA on booking is constitutional; match properly used to obtain warrant and evidence | Denial of suppression upheld: Maryland v. King controls; buccal swab at arrest did not violate Fourth Amendment |
| Whether oral statements to Sgt. Fetterolf should be suppressed (invocation of counsel) | Browne immediately invoked his right to counsel; questioning thereafter violated Edwards and statements must be suppressed | Browne made an ambiguous reference to having a lawyer but affirmatively agreed to talk; invocation was not clear and questioning stopped when he later invoked counsel | Denial of suppression upheld: trial court credited officer’s testimony; invocation not unambiguous under Davis/Edwards so statements (except final request) admissible |
| Sentencing/merger issues (duplicate burglary conviction; false imprisonment merge) | Argued one burglary conviction/sentence should be vacated and false imprisonment should merge with robbery | State defended convictions/sentences | Moot given reversal on mistrial; court did not decide merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayfield v. State, 302 Md. 624 (court may require further deliberation; coercion analysis is fact-specific)
- Smoot v. State, 31 Md. App. 138 (judge’s responses to disclosed numerical splits can be coercive)
- Butler v. State, 392 Md. 169 (unanimity requires voluntary assent; disapproved coercive Allen language)
- Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (U.S. 2013) (Supreme Court: DNA buccal swab of arrestee for serious offense is constitutional)
- Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336 (D.C. 1978) (revealed polling split and identity of dissent raise coercion potential; judge should act to dispel it)
- Harris v. United States, 622 A.2d 697 (D.C. 1993) (two-pronged coercion test: inherent potential + judge’s response)
- U.S. v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2008) (identified holdout who says cannot change verdict compels mistrial rather than instruction)