BROWN v. STATE, 422 P.3d 155

Fabion Brown was tried separately for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of conspiracy for hiring Brodric Glover (via Emily Matheson) to kill his estranged wife; jury convicted on all counts.
State alleged two aggravators: (1) great risk of death to more than one person and (2) murder for remuneration. Jury found both and returned death sentences for the murders; conspiracy conviction received 10 years and a fine.
Brown waived appointed counsel and proceeded pro se through the guilt phase after a Faretta hearing; the court appointed standby counsel for each phase.
During transition to the penalty (second) phase confusion arose about whether Brown still wished to proceed pro se, the role/participation of standby counsel, and whether Brown understood mitigation rights; standby counsel indicated she was unprepared to try the second stage without a continuance.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed guilt and the conspiracy sentence but concluded Brown’s waiver was not sufficiently informed for the punishment phase (insufficient inquiry on mitigation rights and confusing standby-counsel directives), reversed the death sentences, and remanded for resentencing with counsel unless Brown validly waives.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Brown)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Voluntariness/validity of Faretta waiver for guilt phase	Waiver coerced by alleged ineffective counsel and inadequate warnings	Trial court conducted thorough Faretta colloquy; complaints were personality conflicts, not incompetence	Waiver for guilt phase valid — defendant knowingly waived counsel
Waiver for punishment phase / understanding of mitigating evidence	Waiver did not encompass an understanding of penalty-phase rights and mitigation; warnings insufficient	Colloquy covered general dangers; defendant was articulate and had prior pro se filings	Waiver for punishment phase invalid — trial court failed to ensure understanding of mitigation; death sentences reversed
Role and limits of standby counsel (and whether standby counsel’s conduct violated Faretta)	Confusing and contradictory trial-court directions; standby counsel’s statements before Brown were allowed to influence proceedings	Standby counsel was appointed; McKaskle limits unsolicited participation; no record that assistance was denied	Confusion about standby counsel contributed to defective waiver for punishment phase; trial court must clarify standby role on remand
Brady / disclosure of witness mental-health report	Trial court refused Brown copy of Matheson’s mental-health report; argued material and impeaching	State read report on record and ruled it not exculpatory or material	No Brady violation — report not material to guilt or punishment

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has Sixth Amendment right to waive counsel and proceed pro se if waiver is knowing and intelligent)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel; unsolicited participation must not erode pro se defendant's control)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (waiver requires rigorous conveying of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence in capital cases)
Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (framework for Faretta waiver in capital sentencing — must explain mitigating evidence and consequences of waiving it)
Padilla v. United States, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987) (complaints about appointed counsel must rise to ineffective-assistance level to require substitution)
Silkwood v. United States, 893 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1989) (trial court must probe reasons for dissatisfaction before accepting waiver of counsel)