Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804

Background

In March 2004 a shootout between Rickey Brown, Mecco McKinney, and Teon Richardson at an apartment complex killed a 4‑year‑old bystander; Brown and McKinney were tried together and convicted (felony murder based on felon‑in‑possession and related firearm offense), Richardson was later tried and acquitted.
Witness testimony about who fired and who drew first was inconsistent; police recovered unfired TEC‑9 rounds suggesting Richardson’s weapon may have jammed.
Brown and McKinney asserted a justification (self‑defense) theory and sought to introduce evidence of Richardson’s prior violent acts under Chandler; the trial court admitted only some prior‑act evidence and excluded other proffers and Richardson’s testimony when he invoked the Fifth Amendment.
McKinney moved to sever/bifurcate the felon‑in‑possession count (and related felony‑murder theory) to avoid exposing his prior felony; the trial court denied the motion because the felon‑possession count could underlie felony murder.
The court also resolved ancillary evidentiary issues: challenges to alleged prejudicial surplusage/alias in the indictment, denial of striking a juror for cause, admissibility of police reports under the hearsay/necessity exception, admission of a deceased witness’s (Cheryl Jackson) statement, and admission of Brown’s prior similar act as bent‑of‑mind evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Indictment language ("gun battle/crossfire") and alias in caption	State: language accurately describes charged offense and aids clarity	McKinney: language is prejudicial surplusage; alias constitutes impermissible bad‑character evidence	Court: no error; surplusage permissible when descriptive; alias allowable and misnomer must be raised by special plea
Sever/bifurcate felon‑in‑possession count	McKinney: prior felony would be unfair character evidence; bifurcation required when unrelated	State: felon‑in‑possession count might be the underlying felony for felony murder	Court: deny bifurcation because felon‑possession could support felony murder charge
Calling Richardson and use/immunity for defense	Appellants: Richardson’s testimony about prior violence is critical; court should compel or immunize him	State: witness may validly invoke Fifth Amendment; court lacks authority to grant defense‑requested use immunity	Court: properly excluded Richardson when he invoked privilege; defendant may not obtain court‑granted use immunity; claim unpreserved as to immunity request
Admissibility of prior‑act evidence / hearsay (police reports, Cheryl Jackson, Carter)	Appellants: police reports and victim statements necessary under hearsay‑necessity; Jackson’s statement and Carter’s report of Richardson’s boast are admissible	State: reports lacked trustworthiness/identification, Jackson’s statement cumulative, Carter’s hearsay not preserved as non‑hearsay	Court: excluded 1998/1999 reports for lack of trustworthiness/identification; properly denied admission of Jackson’s statement under necessity; Carter’s non‑hearsay argument not preserved but any error was harmless

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (sufficiency review standard)
Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (credibility conflicts for jury resolution)
Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350 (surplusage in indictment doctrine)
Head v. State, 253 Ga. 429 (bifurcation where felon‑possession unrelated)
Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848 (bifurcation inappropriate when felon‑possession may underlie felony murder)
Cody v. State, 278 Ga. 779 (when witness claims Fifth Amendment, court must assess risk of self‑incrimination)
Dampier v. State, 249 Ga. 299 (court cannot grant immunity to defense witness under Georgia law)
United States v. Quinn, 728 F.3d 243 (federal appellate holding that courts lack authority to grant immunity at defendant’s request)
White v. State, 276 Ga. 583 (necessity hearsay exception requirements)
Hanes v. State, 294 Ga. 521 (standards for admissibility of similar transaction evidence)