Brown v. State
295 Ga. 240
Ga.2014Background
- Dwight T. Brown, former Cobb EMC CEO, was indicted in 2011 on theft, false statements, conspiracy, and GA RICO charges arising from patronage capital at Cobb EMC.
- Brown moved to challenge the grand jury array in 2011 to remove Cobb EMC members; no ruling was entered on the motion.
- A second indictment issued July 7, 2011, added witness-influencing charges; Brown moved to abate alleging grand jury bias due to EMC membership.
- Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Brown’s plea in abatement based on propter affectum bias; Brown sought certiorari.
- Brown argued the Cobb EMC grand jurors were biased and that Isaacs and related authority supported removal; the majority held otherwise.
- The court ultimately affirmed the judgment, holding a propter affectum challenge is not a proper basis for abatement when grand jurors are biased; grand jury remains an accusatory body.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether propter affectum grand juror bias supports a plea in abatement | Brown asserts bias due to Cobb EMC membership as grounds for abatement | State contends bias is not a valid ground for abatement in grand jury proceedings | No; bias alone does not require abatement; grand jury is accusatory and bias challenges are limited |
| Whether pre-indictment challenges to grand jurors were proper under OCGA § 17-7-110 | Brown filed pre-indictment motions challenging EMC-affiliated jurors | State argues time limits bar pre-indictment challenges or that they are improper | Pre-indictment propter affectum challenges are permissible under 17-7-110 |
| Whether four Cobb EMC grand jurors’ participation invalidates the indictment | Cobb EMC affiliation taints the indictment | Grand jury is independent; bias cannot be used to automatically invalidate the indictment | Bias alone among jurors does not automatically void an indictment; doctrine requires more evidence of taint |
| Whether the trial court should have removed Cobb EMC grand jurors before the second indictment | Removal warranted to ensure impartiality | No automatic removal; only premised on proper grounds and timely motions | Claim waived if no ruling on the motion to challenge before the second indictment |
| What is the proper scope of remedies for grand jury bias in Georgia | Propter affectum challenges should be available and timely | Remedies limited; burden on system to maintain efficiency | In this case, preservation of indictment proceeds despite bias; no abatement remedy applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717 (1989) (bias without direct pecuniary interest generally not grounds for disqualification; dicta cited on lack of pecuniary disqualification)
- Bitting v. State, 165 Ga. 55 (1927) (court may receive information to purge biased jurors; delay and expense considerations)
- Creamer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 458 (1979) (grand jury is an accusatory body; not inherently required to be impartial)
- Farrar v. State, 187 Ga. 401 (1939) (propter defectum vs. propter affectum distinctions in grand jury challenges)
- Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347 (1892) (early recognition that disqualification cannot be based on mere bias; grand jury as body of inquiry)
- Hall v. State, 7 Ga. App. 115 (1909) (early guidance on bias considerations and challenges to grand juries)